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GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY 
Justin R. Pidot† 
Government actors create law against a backdrop of uncertainty. Limited 
information, unpredictable events, and lack of understanding interfere with 
accurately predicting a legal regime’s costs, benefits, and effects on other legal and 
social programs and institutions. Does the availability of no-fault divorce increase 
the number of terminated marriages? Will bulk-collection of telecommunications 
information about American citizens reveal terrorist plots? Can a sensitive species 
breed in the presence of oil and gas wells? The answers to these questions are far from 
clear, but lawmakers must act nonetheless. 
The problems posed by uncertainty cut across legal fields. Scholars and 
regulators in a variety of contexts recognize the importance of uncertainty, but no 
systematic, generally-applicable framework exists for determining how law should 
account for gaps in information. 
This Article suggests such a framework and develops a typology of strategies for 
accounting for uncertainty in governance. This typology includes “static law,” as well 
as three varieties of “dynamic law.” “Static law” is a legal rule initially intended to 
last in perpetuity. “Dynamic law” is intended to change, and includes: (1) durational 
regulation, or fixed legal rules with periodic opportunities for amendment or repeal; 
(2) adaptive regulation, or malleable legal rules with procedural mechanisms 
allowing rules to change; and (3) contingent regulation, or malleable legal rules with 
triggering mechanisms to substantively change the rules. 
Each of these strategies, alone or in combination, may best address the 
uncertainty inherent in a particular lawmaking effort. This Article provides a 
diagnostic framework that lawmakers can use to identify optimal strategies. 
Ultimately, this approach to uncertainty yields immediate practical benefits by 
enabling lawmakers to better structure governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When governmental actors create legal regimes, they do so in the 
face of uncertainty.1 They predict a regime’s costs, its results, and its 
 
 1 When I refer to “legal regimes” or “law” I mean the full panoply of legal rules—statutes, 
regulations, and court decisions. Similarly, “lawmakers” constitute those that create legal rules, 
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effect on other legal and social institutions. But these predictions are 
often just educated guesses. Limited information, unpredictable events, 
and lack of understanding mean that lawmakers inevitably face difficult 
choices about how to regulate a changing world. Indeed, advances in 
knowledge often serve to unmask the extent of uncertainty, rather than 
to resolve it. Albert Einstein’s famous statement about mathematics 
applies with equal force to law: “As far as the [laws] . . . refer to reality, 
they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to 
reality.”2 Governments operate against this backdrop of ubiquitous 
uncertainty. 
Let’s consider a few examples. When Congress appropriates money 
annually to fund the federal government, it makes decisions based on 
projections of tax revenue. These projections may be right and they may 
be wrong. In 2007, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office 
overestimated federal revenue for 2008 by more than $200 billion.3 At 
the start of 2011, the Office underestimated federal revenue for that year 
by $70 billion.4 Likewise, when a state highway department adjusts the 
speed limit on a highway to enhance public safety, it may accurately 
understand the relationship between speed and public safety, or it may 
not. For example, evidence is equivocal that Montana’s accident rate 
declined when the state imposed a seventy-five miles per hour daytime 
speed limit on highways that had previously been unrestricted. 5 
Counterintuitively, posting a speed limit could lead individuals to drive 
faster or to refrain from wearing their seat belts.6 And when public land 
managers authorize development of natural resources, they might not 
 
whether they occupy positions in the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of government. 
 2 Albert Einstein, Geometry and Experience, Lecture Before the Prussian Academy of 
Sciences (Jan. 27, 1921), http://www.relativitycalculator.com/pdfs/einstein_geometry_and_
experience_1921.pdf. 
 3 Compare CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE x 
tbl.1 (2007), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/08-23-
update07_0.pdf (estimating 2008 total revenues at $2.771 trillion), with CONG. BUDGET OFF., 
THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2009 TO 2019 16 tbl.5 (2009), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/reports/01-07-outlook.pdf 
(reporting 2008 total revenues of $2.524 trillion); see also CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE 
UNCERTAINTY OF BUDGET PROJECTIONS: A DISCUSSION OF DATA AND METHODS (2007), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/03-05-uncertain.pdf. 
 4 Compare CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 
2011 TO 2021 xii tbl.1 (2011), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-
2012/reports/01-26_fy2011outlook.pdf (estimating 2011 total revenues at $2.228 trillion), with 
CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2012 TO 2022, xii 
tbl.1 (2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/01-31-
2012_Outlook.pdf (reporting 2011 revenues at $2.302 trillion). 
 5 See, e.g., Press Release, Chad Dornsife, Nat’l Motorists Ass’n, Montana: No Speed Limit 
Safety Paradox (May 10, 2001), http://www.motorists.org/press/montana-no-speed-limit-
safety-paradox.  
 6 Id. 
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accurately predict how development will affect the health of sensitive 
species. For example, in 2000, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
developed a blueprint for natural gas development in the Pinedale 
region of Wyoming based on estimates about the effects that 
development would have on resident greater sage grouse.7 Eight years 
later, sage grouse populations had declined significantly more than 
predicted.8 These examples demonstrate the obvious: the world is a 
dynamic place. The environment, the economy, and technology—each 
of these areas involves significant uncertainty. Yet, law must respond to 
social, environmental, and economic problems. Lawmakers must act, 
even recognizing the limits of their knowledge, or else remain forever 
paralyzed.9 
Notwithstanding uncertainty, governance can successfully pursue 
the goals of lawmakers. Law can be crafted to forthrightly address 
uncertainty and to respond to new and emerging information and 
circumstances. Where legal rules serve an instrumental purpose, 
accounting for uncertainty may enable those rules to better accomplish 
that purpose.10 
Scholars in an array of fields have recognized that legal rules can be 
improved by taking account of the uncertainty facing lawmakers. The 
efficacy of dynamic and flexible legal regimes has been a dominant 
discourse in the field of environmental and natural resources law.11 
Scholars in fields as disparate as financial policy12 and international law 
have also considered the issue.13 Yet despite the widespread interest in 
developing governance strategies to account for uncertainty, no legal 
scholarship has yet offered a systematic, trans-substantive framework 
 
 7 See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 69–70 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011). 
 8 See, e.g., id. 
 9 Sometimes, lawmakers invoke uncertainty to justify non-action. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. 
S1693–01 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (opposing extension of the Price-
Anderson Act due to a lack of information about the nuclear industry). 
 10 Where law serves other functions, such as codifying a moral intuition, lawmakers will 
still face uncertainty, but it may be less relevant to their decision-making. For advocates of 
marriage equality, for example, even if uncertainty existed about the effect that same-sex 
marriage would have on marriage rates in the country, such uncertainty would not bear on the 
moral imperative to grant same-sex couples equal rights. 
 11 See, e.g., Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46 
AKRON L. REV. 933, 938 (2013); Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law 
for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014); Holly Doremus, Adaptive 
Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1455, 1459 (2011) [hereinafter 
Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem]; Annecoos Wiersema, A Train 
Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural 
Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1248–53 (2008). 
 12 See Zachary J. Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129, 134 (2014). 
 13 See Rosie Cooney & Andrew T.F. Lang, Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Adaptive 
Governance and International Trade, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523, 524, 534 (2007). 
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for understanding the relationship between governance and 
uncertainty.14 
This Article takes up that task. In particular, it develops a typology 
of governance strategies, as illustrated in Figure 1, and provides a 
diagnostic framework to guide selection among those strategies. This 
typology includes what I will refer to as “static law,” as well as three 
varieties of “dynamic law.” Static law is defined as substantive legal rules 
intended at the outset to regulate in perpetuity. Dynamic law includes 
(1) durational regulation, defined as fixed legal rules with periodic 
opportunities for amendment or repeal; (2) adaptive regulation, defined 
as legal rules coupled with procedural mechanisms to require 
reconsideration if new information emerges; and (3) contingent 
regulation, defined as legal rules coupled with triggers for automatic 
adjustment based on foreseen future events. Each of these tools 
appropriately addresses uncertainty in some circumstances. Each 
provides benefits and each imposes costs. Understanding the unique 
dimensions of each tool can guide lawmakers to create legal regimes 




These tools are classified from an ex ante perspective: the character 
of a legal regime is established at the point of its creation, not at any 
subsequent point in time. All law, even static law, is subject to 
 
 14 By trans-substantive, I mean that principles relating to incorporating uncertainty into 
legal rules “do not vary depending upon the antecedent legal regime.” David Marcus, Trans- 
Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1193 (2013); see also 
David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371 (2010). 
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amendment or reconsideration. What distinguishes static law from 
dynamic law—and adaptive regulation, durational regulation, and 
contingent regulation from one another—are the mechanisms by which 
lawmakers account for uncertainty at the moment they create a legal 
rule. Did lawmakers envision future changes to the law? Did they 
facilitate such changes? These are the questions that delineate the 
governance strategies examined in this Article.  
As a concrete example of these strategies in action, consider the 
following situation: A local zoning board debates restricting 
construction near the ocean to avoid new development in areas 
threatened by a rise in sea level. The board has a suite of options. First, it 
could rely on static law and—based on the best information it can 
find—prohibit all development within one vertical foot of the best 
estimated mean high water line fifty years hence. Such an approach has 
advantages. It provides certainty about legal limitations and avoids 
public expenditures associated with monitoring sea level rise and 
modifying development rules. The approach also has costs because it 
may not optimally govern development. If sea level rises by more than 
estimated, the one-foot rule will inadequately protect new construction. 
If sea level rises by less than estimated, the one-foot rule will overly 
restrict the use of land. 
As an alternative to static law, the board could rely on durational 
regulation and impose the one-foot rule, but make the rule expire in ten 
years, forcing the board to revisit the issue at that time and incorporate 
new information about any rise in sea level. Or the board could take an 
adaptive regulatory approach by imposing the one-foot rule coupled 
with a provision that automatically triggers reconsideration if the rate of 
sea level rise exceeds expectations. Finally, the board could rely on 
contingent regulation and impose the one-foot rule coupled with a 
decision tree for regulatory adjustment, allowing the development ban 
to automatically adjust to the best scientific prediction for a future rise 
in sea level. If estimates for a rise in sea level increased by a foot, the 
one-foot ban would become a two-foot ban. If science indicates that the 
sea level is no longer expected to change, then the ban would be relaxed. 
This Article considers each of these tools as archetypes, evaluating 
the purest form of each strategy to reveal core advantages and 
disadvantages. In practice, of course, legal regimes will diverge from 
these archetypes, incorporating strategies that rely on multiple tools. 
While complexity will inevitably occur in the real world, understanding 
the strengths and weakness of each distinct approach can lead to better 
designs for legal regimes. 
The approach lawmakers select to account for uncertainty matters. 
Too often, efforts that seem promising in the abstract flounder, resulting 
in a system of purportedly dynamic law failing to keep pace with 
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unfolding events. Environmental law has borne witness to numerous 
such failed efforts as the promise that a legal rule will account for new 
information often gives way to political and legal forces invested in the 
status quo. For example, the plan BLM adopted in 2000 to govern oil 
and gas development in the Pinedale Anticline included a mechanism of 
adaptive regulation to adjust the rules as the effects of development on 
resident sage grouse became better understood. 15 The plan swiftly 
confronted legal challenges,16 and despite mounting evidence that oil 
and gas development was hurting the resident sage grouse population 
more than expected, no change in management occurred.17 In 2008, 
BLM abandoned its 2000 plan entirely.18 
Recognizing the strengths and weakness of the tools discussed in 
this Article can help lawmakers do a better job taking account of 
incomplete information. Contingent regulation in particular may 
ameliorate thorny problems that are endemic to previous attempts at 
dynamic law. Such efforts have faced stiff obstacles because governing 
bodies have often failed to provide the ongoing resources that are 
necessary to successfully revisit existing rules and, where such 
revisitation has occurred, interest group politics appears to have 
obstructed meaningful change.19 In situations where lawmakers can 
accurately predict a range of likely future circumstances, contingent 
regulation allows for rapid modification of legal rules without requiring 
further intervention by the lawmakers themselves, thereby avoiding the 
delay and commitment of resources attendant to reconsideration of 
existing rules. At the same time, contingent regulation carries baggage: 
unlike adaptive or durational regulation, contingent regulation cannot 
respond to unforeseen circumstances or incorporate strategies that 
develop after enactment of the legal regime. It is, in other words, 
significantly less nimble than other forms of dynamic law. 
Before proceeding further, a word on nomenclature is necessary. 
This Article develops a set of standardized terms. Existing terminology 
is both underinclusive and overinclusive. The terms used here—static 
law, durational regulation, adaptive regulation, and contingent 
 
 15 See THEODORE ROOSEVELT CONSERVATION P’SHIP, PINEDALE ANTICLINE FACT SHEET 3, 
http://www.trcp.org/assets/pdf/pinedale-anticline-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
 16 See id. (explaining that the Pindedale Anticline Working Group, a citizens’ advisory 
committee, was challenged as a violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act). 
 17 See Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 18 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT FOR THE PINEDALE ANTICLINE OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECT app. 10-2 (2008) [hereinafter BLM 2008 SEIS APPENDIX], http://www.blm.gov/style/
medialib/blm/wy/information/NEPA/pfodocs/anticline/fseis.Par.41023.File.dat/11App10.pdf. 
 19 See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in 
Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 329–34 (2007). 
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regulation—refer precisely to the mechanisms in a legal regime that 
allow (or not) new information to modify that regime. Sometimes, these 
terms cut more broadly than those currently in use. For example, 
durational regulation encompasses law that includes termination dates, 
which others have termed “experimental rules” or “temporary 
legislation,” and other techniques for promoting reconsideration of legal 
rules.20 The terms used in this Article do not encompass ancillary 
measures that are necessary for successful dynamic law. For example, 
the term adaptive management, which is ubiquitous in the 
environmental and natural resources literature, often refers to a legal 
regime that includes both an internal procedure for modifying legal 
rules, which this Article would describe as adaptive regulation, and a 
comprehensive monitoring program to derive information about 
environmental conditions that can fuel that process of modification.21 
Environmental monitoring, and other means of assessing the 
effectiveness of law, is a necessary component of any effective strategy to 
make law respond to changing circumstances. Otherwise, new 
information may not emerge. Monitoring is, however, distinct from the 
legal mechanisms that enable dynamism, and such efforts are not 
included as part of the definition of adaptive regulation. 
The terms used here also avoid conceptual muddiness that has 
arisen in the existing literature. For example, some scholars and 
regulatory documents use the term adaptive management to refer to any 
mechanism that allows regulatory regimes to change, regardless of 
whether that mechanism involves substance or procedure.22 Others 
insist that only process-oriented mechanisms for change constitute true 
adaptive management. 23  This Article disaggregates process- and 
substance-based mechanisms into adaptive regulation and contingent 
regulation, sidestepping this debate and allowing independent analysis 
of each strategy. 
Finally, this Article holds certain things constant as it explores 
governance strategies. First, it does not address vexing problems about 
how to set goals for governance and, relatedly, how to establish risk 
 
 20 Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (2007); See Gubler, supra 
note 12. 
 21 See, e.g., Biber, supra note 11, at 934–35; Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the 
Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenge of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 
41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 53 (2001) [hereinafter Doremus, “New Age” Environmental Protection]. 
 22 See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop and 
Back Again, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 59, 71–72 (2005); Courtney Schultz & Martin Nie, 
Decision-Making Triggers, Adaptive Management, and Natural Resources Law and Planning, 52 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 443, 444 (2012). 
 23 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 424, 426, 430–31 (2010). 
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tolerance in any particular legal regime.24 Second, it does not address 
what policy instruments best achieve established goals. Strenuous 
disagreement exists about whether regulatory prohibitions or market 
mechanisms optimally address social problems. These debates are 
orthogonal to the issues explored here.25 Either approach could be 
deployed as static law, durational regulation, adaptive regulation, or 
contingent regulation. Third, debates about lawmaking often involve 
discussions about locating decisions with the appropriate government 
actor—local, state, federal, or international.26 That debate also does little 
to inform the choice between dynamic and static law. Governments at 
all levels can avail themselves of the suite of strategies discussed here.27 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides an account of 
uncertainty across contexts. Part II discusses static law, identifies 
examples, and explores the benefits and burdens created by relying on 
that approach. Part III provides similar treatment to each form of 
dynamic law. And Part IV provides a diagnostic framework to enable 
lawmakers to better design legal regimes in particular circumstances. It 
does so by exploring the costs and benefits of making law dynamic, the 
variability of uncertainty, and the resource constraints that lawmakers 
face. Different combinations of these factors suggest certain and 
identifiable regulatory responses. 
A more systematic approach to governing uncertainty will result in 
better governance and better social outcomes. This Article provides 
guideposts for lawmakers who are faced with the difficult task of 
creating legal rules without complete information. 
I.     UNCERTAINTY ACROSS CONTEXT 
Lawmakers never act with perfect information. Never. Social and 
natural conditions change, prevailing norms evolve, and even in the 
absence of change, lawmakers often misunderstand both the conditions 
 
 24 See Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L. REV. 
265, 270 (2009). 
 25 A market-based approach that creates tradable emissions permits could, for example, 
include a contingent approach if additional permits were set to be injected into the market if 
the price of each permit exceeded a certain threshold. 
 26 See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 
795, 803 (2005). 
 27 That is not to say that the nature of the governmental entity that is engaged in lawmaking 
is unimportant to the selection of appropriate tools. As discussed in Part IV.C, infra, the 
resource endowment of a lawmaking body is an important factor in designing a dynamic legal 
regime. Resource endowment may loosely correlate with the level of government—for example, 
federal agencies may possess more resources then municipal governments—but tool selection is 
not sensitive to the level of government itself. 
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they seek to control and the effects of the regulatory interventions they 
select. A legal tool well-suited to control a relatively rare activity may 
become antiquated, inefficient, or ineffective if that activity becomes 
common.28 Nonetheless, law is often made with little thought about the 
eventuality of new information emerging or about social conditions 
changing. Sometimes that approach makes sense. Sometimes the 
uncertainties facing lawmakers are modest, and the benefits of a stable 
legal regime outweigh the benefits that would accrue from dynamic and 
responsive legal rules. Not always. 
Uncertainty is not monolithic.29 Lawmakers may know virtually 
nothing about a significant aspect of a problem they seek to address. For 
example, if the international community decides to pursue a strategy of 
geoengineering to reduce the magnitude of climate change, that effort 
would face staggering uncertainty about the efficacy of the intervention 
and the potential magnitude of any secondary effects.30 On the other 
hand, uncertainty may be of a lesser degree. For example, when a city 
decides to open a new library, it may not be able to perfectly forecast the 
number of patrons, but based on its experience, it may be able to arrive 
at a reasonable estimate, and in any event the consequences of 
misestimating may be modest. Uncertainty also may be foreseen or 
entirely unknown. In other words, lawmakers may understand their 
own lack of knowledge, or they may be unaware of that deficit. 
The problems uncertainty poses for governance has received 
considerable attention in a few contexts, particularly in environmental 
and natural resources law, which over the course of decades has 
attempted to reinvent the regulatory state to enable an iterative 
decision-making process that continually incorporates new 
information.31 Recently, J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman have engaged in 
broader examination of one type of legal change: the termination of 
legal regimes, which they refer to as exit.32 In essence, exit is simply a 
 
 28 Hannah Wiseman has referred to the phenomenon of a governance decisions becoming 
inefficacious due to the increasing scale of a regulated activity as a “regulatory diseconomy of 
scale.” Hannah J. Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory Diseconomies of Scale, 94 B.U. L. REV. 235, 
238 (2014). 
 29 See infra Part IV.B. 
 30 See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
673, 678 (2013) (“[G]eoengineering involves grave uncertainties and potential hazards.”). 
 31 See, e.g., Craig & Ruhl, supra note 11, at 1, 7. “Adaptive management,” as this effort is 
labeled in regulatory reform, has received considerable attention. Westlaw’s database of journal 
and law review articles indicates that nearly 300 articles have used the term “adaptive 
management” in the same paragraph as “natural resources” or “environment.” 
 32 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulatory Exit, VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482392. Ruhl and Salzman 
comprehensively analyze the means by which both regulatory and benefit providing 
government programs end. They argue that “it is as important to think clearly about exit in the 
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form of radical legal evolution that occurs when lawmakers respond to 
new information or changing circumstances that demonstrate that a 
legal regime is beyond saving, or perhaps, that the targeted problem has 
been solved. In any case, as with the problem of exit, the core task of 
governing in the face of uncertainty is trans-substantive. Similarities in 
the task of governing without complete information suggest similarities 
in response. Lawmakers seeking to protect environmental assets can 
learn from lawmakers seeking to protect the health of financial markets 
and vice versa.  
This Part sets the stage for the exploration that follows by briefly 
discussing uncertainty in three contexts: the regulation of driving, 
financial markets, and environment and natural resources. These fields 
involve local, state, federal, and international government entities.33 All 
branches of government are involved, including legislatures, executive 
branch agencies, and courts. In other words, these examples reveal that 
an analysis of uncertainty and governance can guide the decisions of 
virtually all governmental actors. 
A.     Driving 
The most straightforward of the three examples is driving 
regulations, sometimes referred to as the “rules of the road.”34 Some 
rules of the road are constant, such as requiring driving on the right 
hand side of the road in the United States.35 Others vary from location 
to location and over time, such as applicable speed limits. 
Uncertainty pervades decisions about the rules of the road. Start 
with the most fundamental tenet of traffic regulations in the United 
States: drivers must use the right side of the road.36 This rule was 
 
administrative state as it is to think clearly about the creation of new programs in the first 
place.” Id. at 38. I agree that questions about regulatory exit are crucial. Law makers should 
consider exit strategies alongside other issues related to the evolution of legal rules. 
 33 For a discussion of interactions between levels of government institution, see Justin 
Pidot, Deconstructing Disaster, 2013 BYU L. REV. 213, 243–54 (2013) [hereinafter Pidot, 
Deconstructing Disaster]. See also, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural 
Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 184 (2005) (discussing cooperative federalism). 
 34 See the rule of the road, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010), http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/166506?isAdvanced=true&result=1&rskey=AhhFIw& (defined at note P15 to the 
entry for “road”) (defining “rule of the road” as “more generally (usu. in pl.) a set of rules and 
guidance for road users”). 
 35 See, e.g., Convention on Road Traffic art. 9, Sept. 19, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3008. 
 36 The importance of standardizing the side of the road used within a particular jurisdiction 
is sufficiently great that an international convention has been ratified by 95 countries requiring 
standardization. The Convention on Road Traffic provides that “[a]ll vehicular traffic 
proceeding in the same direction on any road shall keep to the same side of the road, which 
shall be uniform in each country for all roads.” Id. 
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developed as a custom in the colonial era and was first codified by the 
Pennsylvania state legislature in 1792.37 Selecting a driving side had 
consequences that were unforeseen at the time. A study published by J.J. 
Leeming in 1969 found that fewer traffic accidents occur in countries 
that require driving on the left. 38  Christian Foerch and Helmuth 
Steinmetz explain that this phenomenon may occur, at least in part, 
because of asymmetric patterns in the development of brain lesions 
following a stroke.39 When the United States adopted its rules regarding 
driving side, this information did not exist. Uncertainty, then, colored 
even this oft-cited example of a “coordination norm,” in which the 
specifics of a legal rule are viewed as inconsequential.40 In other words, 
even the most basic, seemingly unimportant, lawmaking exercises 
involve uncertainty because the consequences of those exercises may not 
be fully understood. 
Establishing speed limits also involves uncertainty. Public roads in 
the United States have posted speed limits to promote public safety.41 
The relationship between speed limits and public safety, however, 
continues to be debated,42 as does the degree of safety afforded by any 
 
 37 See An Act to Enable the Governor of this Commonwealth to Incorporate a Company for 
Making an Artificial Road from the City of Philadelphia to the Borough of Lancaster, ch. 1640, 
§ 21 (1792), reprinted in 14 The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, at 279, 293 
(James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1909), http://www.palrb.us/statutesatlarge/17001799/
1792/0/act/1640.pdf; see also Richard F. Weingroff, On the Right Side of the Road, FED. 
HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/right.cfm (last updated Oct. 17, 
2013). Historians have speculated that the custom emerged either as a means of distancing the 
colony from the traditions of England or because of predominant right-handedness and 
accessibility to whips and guns. Id.; Dan Keegan, Driving on the Wrong Side, DRIVERS.COM 
(Dec. 5, 2006), http://www.drivers.com/article/332. 
 38 J.J. LEEMING, ROAD ACCIDENTS: PREVENT OR PUNISH (1969). 
 39 Christian Foerch & Helmuth Steinmetz, Left-Sided Traffic Directionality May Be the Safer 
“Rule of the Road” for Ageing Populations, 73 MED. HYPOTHESES 20, 20 (2009). 
 40 Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1186 
(2013) (“Some conventions are probably pure coordination norms, such as driving on one side 
of the road or the other (or so a stock example runs).” (footnote omitted)); see also Richard H. 
McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1060 (2005) 
(identifying the “choice of whether to drive on the left or right side of the road” as a “pure 
coordination game”). The fact that driving-side rules affect public health does not mean that 
they should not be viewed as a coordination norm, since the coordination function of such 
rules predominates. Rather, this example illustrates that every choice—even those involving 
coordination norms—may have unforeseen consequences. 
 41 See State Traffic and Speed Laws, MASS. INST. TECH., http://www.mit.edu/~jfc/laws.html#
types (last modified Apr. 12, 2015). Speed limits can also serve other goals, including 
promotion of efficient transportation and fuel economy. See, e.g., Allen M. Brabender, The 
Misapplication of Minnesota’s Speeding Statute and the Need to Raise the Posted Limit or 
Expand Use of the Dimler Amendment, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 4 (2004); Barbara Kritchevsky, 
Whose Idea Was It? Why Violations of State Laws Enacted Pursuant to Federal Mandates 
Should Not Be Negligence Per Se, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 693, 695 (2009). 
 42 See, e.g., Dornsife, supra note 5 (arguing that Montana speed limits did not improve 
public safety); Lee S. Friedman et al., Long-Term Effects of Repealing the National Maximum 
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particular speed limit along any particular stretch of road. Some studies 
suggest that speed limits have little effect on average driving speeds, and 
others suggest that average driving speeds may have little effect on 
public safety.43 Moreover, some studies find that reducing a speed limit 
may sometimes cause more accidents.44 Local and state transportation 
regulators must act with the knowledge that they cannot predict the 
results of their actions perfectly. 
B.     Environment and Natural Resources 
Environmental and natural resources law has an intimate 
relationship with the science of natural systems. 45  Scholars and 
lawmakers fixate on uncertainty because of a sea change in the scientific 
understanding of ecology. 46  When Congress enacted most federal 
environmental laws, the majority of scientists viewed the natural world 
as inherently stable: ecosystems followed predictable evolutionary 
stages, often referred to as stages of succession, and perturbations in the 
natural environment dampened over time.47 Nature resembled a lake’s 
surface on a windless day. A rock cast into the lake would create ripples, 
but those ripples would diminish and ultimately disappear. Under this 
account, human activity disturbed a natural equilibrium state, 
threatening permanent disturbance of the natural condition. 
Environmental and natural resources law sought to minimize and 
ameliorate that disturbance, seeking a return to the placidity of the 
lake’s surface. 
The trouble with the equilibrium view of ecology is that it fails to 
explain changes observed in natural systems in the absence of human 
intervention. As a result, that view fell into disrepute.48 The ecological 
model that replaced it posited that the state of nature is a “complex, 
 
Speed Limit in the United States, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1626, 1626 (2009) (finding a 9.1% 
increase of fatalities on rural interstates following the repeal of federal speed limit). 
 43 See FRED MANNERING, THE EFFECTS OF INTERSTATE SPEED LIMITS ON DRIVING SPEEDS: 
SOME NEW EVIDENCE (2007), http://ibtta.org/sites/default/files/Speed%20Limit%20and%
20factors%20safety.pdf; Patrick McCarthy, Effect of Speed Limits on Speed Distributions and 
Highway Safety: A Survey of Recent Literature, 21 TRANSPORT REVIEWS 31, 36–37 (2001). 
 44 See MANNERING, supra note 43. 
 45 See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law: Ethics or Science?, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 193, 194 (1996) (arguing that “environmental law and management should derive their 
primary political power and legitimacy from science”); Wiersema, supra note 11, at 1245. 
 46 See, e.g., KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS 
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 9–12 (1993). 
 47 See, e.g., Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on 
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 863–69 (1994). 
 48 See id. at 869. 
PIDOT.37.1.3 (Do Not Delete) 10/26/2015 1:05 PM 
126 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 37:113 
stochastic nonequilibrium one.”49 The popular notion of the “butterfly 
effect,” which fancifully describes the flap of a butterfly’s wings causing 
a tornado on the other side of the globe, captures the essence of this 
model.50 With the rise of this new understanding of ecology, legal 
scholars advocated for a new model of regulation. J.B. Ruhl, among the 
most prolific of these scholars, explained the need for regulatory 
reinvention: “To manage the impact of human society on the inherently 
chaotic, adaptive environment, the environmental law system itself must 
possess those dynamical qualities.”51 
Uncertainty in environmental and natural resources law is not 
abstract. The BLM regulates natural gas development on federal lands in 
Sublette County, Wyoming that overlie a geologic formation known as 
the Pinedale Anticline, which is believed to contain the third largest 
natural gas reserve in the United States.52 Large numbers of natural gas 
wells permeate the area.53 Those lands also provide important habitats 
for the greater sage grouse,54 a species being considered for listing under 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA).55 Evidence suggests that oil and gas 
development disrupts greater sage grouse mating rituals, thereby 
reducing the population.56 The extent of that effect remains unclear, as 
does the distance in time at which the effect declines or disappears.57 
 
 49 A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of 
Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1994); see also Jonathan B. Wiener, Law 
and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 327 
(1995) (reviewing JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH: A STORY OF EVOLUTION IN 
OUR TIME (1994)). 
 50 See THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT (New Line Cinema 2004). For the origins of the term, see 
Edward N. Lorenz, Professor of Meteorology, Mass. Inst. of Tech., Predictability; Does the Flap 
of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set off a Tornado in Texas, Address at the 139th Meeting of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science (Dec. 29, 1972). 
 51 J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean 
Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 940 (1997) 
[hereinafter Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law]. 
 52 See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2012); Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 
F.3d 66, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 53 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DECISION FOR THE SUPPLEMENTAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PINEDALE ANTICLINE OIL AND GAS 
EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 4 (2008) [hereinafter BLM ROD], 
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wy/information/NEPA/pfodocs/anticline/
rod.Par.50775.File.dat/00ROD.pdf. 
 54 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., 1 FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT FOR THE PINEDALE ANTICLINE OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECT 3-140–3-147 (2008) [hereinafter BLM 2008 SEIS], http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/
blm/wy/information/NEPA/pfodocs/anticline/fseis.Par.30367.File.dat/vol1_ea.pdf. 
 55 See, e.g., Diane Cardwell & Clifford Krauss, Frack Quietly, Please: Sage Grouse is Nesting, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2014, at A1. 
 56 See BLM 2008 SEIS, supra note 54, at 3-143. 
 57 As BLM considered reauthorizing an oil and gas development plan in 2008, wildlife 
groups urged it to impose a two-mile buffer zone around leks, which are areas in which a 
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Moreover, other factors also contribute to the decline of the greater sage 
grouse, including livestock management, 58  invasive plants, wildfire 
frequency, climate change, and direct habitat loss and fragmentation.59 
As a result, it is unknown whether regulating oil and gas development 
can slow or halt the decline of the greater sage grouse population, or 
what regulatory interventions will best protect the species. 
Traditional environmental law also encounters uncertainty. The 
Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
establish a primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) 
for seven air pollutants at a level sufficient to protect public health, 
allowing for “an adequate margin of safety.”60 The public health effects 
of air pollution are, however, incompletely understood. For example, in 
2011 the EPA undertook a review of the primary NAAQS for carbon 
monoxide, considering epidemiological data suggesting that carbon 
monoxide could pose a greater risk to human health than previously 
thought. 61  The EPA determined, however, that the data failed to 
demonstrate a causal link between carbon monoxide concentrations and 
adverse health effects.62 Because that link was sufficiently uncertain in 
the EPA’s view, it declined to more strictly regulate carbon monoxide.63 
C.     Financial Markets 
Understanding financial markets—as well as the entities that 
participate in them and the transactions that affect them—also involves 
 
species performs communal mating rituals. See Steve Davies, BLM’s Pinedale Anticline EIS 
Survives Appeal, ENDANGERED SPECIES & WETLANDS REP. (Nov. 18, 2011), 
http://www.eswr.com/2011/11/blms-pinedale-anticline-eis-survives-appeal. BLM opted to 
impose a half-mile buffer zone instead. BLM ROD, supra note 53, at A-18. 
 58 See Greater Sage-Grouse Umbrella Candidate Conservation Agreement with Assurances 
for Wyoming Ranch Management between [redacted private landowner(s)] and the U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Serv. (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.fws.gov/wyominges/PDFs/Species_Listed/Umbrella_
CCAA/WY%20Statewide%20Ranch%20Management%20Sage-grouse%20CCAA.pdf. 
 59 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., THE GREATER SAGE-GROUSE: FACTS, FIGURES AND 
DISCUSSION 2 (2015), http://www.fws.gov/greatersagegrouse/factsheets/GreaterSageGrouse
Canon_FINAL.pdf. 
 60 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (b)(1) (2012); see WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW156–
57 (2d ed. 1994). The EPA cannot consider other facts, such as the cost that a NAAQS might 
impose. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475–76 (2001); see also David M. 
Driesen, Should Congress Direct the EPA to Allow Serious Harms to Public Health to Continue?: 
Cost-Benefit Tests and NAAQS Under the Clean Air Act, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 217, 223 (1998). 
 61 See Review of National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Carbon Monoxide, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 54,294, 54,294–54,297 (Aug. 31, 2011). 
 62 See Cmtys. for a Better Env’t v. EPA, 748 F.3d 333, 336 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 63 Id. 
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uncertainty.64 A few seemingly simple and widely agreed upon goals 
dominate regulation in this field: economic regulation should aim for 
stable growth, low unemployment, controlled inflation,65 and should 
prevent fraud and other dishonest dealings that destabilize the 
economy.66 How government can best accomplish those goals, and 
whether government intervention can succeed at all, are hotly 
contested.67 This dispute is in part ideological, but it is compounded by 
a lack of knowledge and information. As Roberta Romano has 
explained, “the nub of the regulatory problem derives from the fact that 
financial firms operate in a dynamic environment in which there are 
many unknowns and unknowables and state-of-the-art knowledge 
quickly obsolesces.”68 
 
 64 Indeed, as Steven McNamara has explained, scholars debate even the extent to which the 
function of financial systems can be understood: 
For the academics who study the financial system, derivatives regulation highlights 
certain crucial epistemological questions: What are the limits of the evidence that can 
be drawn on to obtain an accurate understanding of the financial system?: How 
should we view propositions that we highly suspect may be true but cannot 
confidently prove? And how should we deal with uncertainty, both in the attempt to 
accurately understand the financial system, and in the possible effects of the 
regulations we impose on it? 
Steven McNamara, Financial Markets Uncertainty and the Rawlsian Argument for Central 
Counterparty Clearing of OTC Derivatives, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 211 
(2014). 
 65 Congress has entrusted these responsibilities to the Federal Reserve and the Federal Open 
Market Committee. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012) (“The Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the 
monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to 
increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable 
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”). 
 66 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (2012) (justifying regulation of securities transactions because 
“[n]ational emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the dislocation of 
trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate commerce and adversely affect 
the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by manipulation and sudden 
and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices and by excessive speculation on such 
exchanges and markets”). 
 67 See, e.g., Editorial, Jobs and the Fed: Near-Zero Interest Rates Haven’t Led to Robust 
Economic Growth, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2014, 5:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/jobs-and-
the-fed-1406933061; Patrick Brennan, Rand Paul Endorses an Aggressive Fed, NAT'L REV.: 
CORNER BLOG (Aug. 9, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/355385/rand-
paul-endorses-aggressive-fed-patrick-brennan; Peter Wallison, Hey, Barney Frank: The 
Government Did Cause the Housing Crisis, ATLANTIC (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/12/hey-barney-frank-the-government-did-
cause-the-housing-crisis/249903. 
 68 Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF 
CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 87 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012); see also Brett McDonnell, 
Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN. 
ST. L. REV. 1, 18 (2011) (“How do we go about regulating financial markets and institutions in 
light of the vast uncertainty that confronts both the regulators and the regulated?”). 
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Consider the “great recession” that began in 2007.69 The public 
looked to Congress and other government entities to implement policies 
to promote economic recovery and to safeguard against another 
catastrophic failure in the financial markets.70 That task was made 
difficult because lawmakers acted “with a radically inadequate 
understanding of what went wrong and of the effect proposed 
regulations w[ould] likely have.”71 
Uncertainty for financial regulators exists even in ordinary 
economic times. For example, when the Federal Reserve establishes a 
target interest rate in hopes of spurring economic growth while avoiding 
undue inflation, it can do no more than make an educated guess about 
the effects of its decision.72 Similarly, when Congress and the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) impose disclosure 
obligations on financial institutions or prohibit certain types of 
transactions, they make educated guesses that the adopted policy will 
generate benefits in terms of transparency and economic stability 
without unnecessarily increasing transaction costs or prohibiting 
experimentation that could lead to growth.73 In each circumstance, the 
lawmaker—Congress, the Federal Reserve, and the SEC—knows that 
any policy would involve substantial tradeoffs, but the magnitude of 
those tradeoffs is unknown, and possibly unknowable. 
D.     And Everywhere Else 
These three examples illustrate the sheer breadth of the challenges 
posed by uncertainty. Uncertainty exists everywhere, including 
whenever the government acts. Will increasing prison sentences for 
migrants convicted of illegal reentry deter noncitizen drug traffickers, as 
 
 69 See Chris Isidore, The Great Recession: Economists Generally Agree This Is the Worst 
Economic Downturn Since the Great Depression, but They Say Despite Pain, Another Depression 
Isn’t Likely, CNN (Mar. 25, 2009, 5:19 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/25/news/economy/
depression_comparisons. This worldwide economic downturn had numerous causes, and the 
collapse of the financial markets was, in a sense, a symptom of systemic problems in credit 
markets and in other sectors. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST 
DEMOCRACY 5–7 (2010). 
 70 See, e.g., Buffett Warns Congress: Lawmakers Face “Biggest Financial Meltdown in 
American History” If They Don’t Act, CNN (Sept. 28, 2008, 11:40 AM), http://money.cnn.com/
2008/09/28/news/economy/Buffett.bailout/?postversion=2008092811. 
 71 See McDonnell, supra note 68, at 2–3. 
 72 See, e.g., Richard Clarida et al., The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian 
Perspective, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1661, 1661 (1999) (“[A] stream of empirical work 
beginning in the late 1980s has made the case that monetary policy significantly influences the 
short-term course of the real economy. The precise amount remains open to debate.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 73 See Gubler, supra note 12, at 137–38. 
PIDOT.37.1.3 (Do Not Delete) 10/26/2015 1:05 PM 
130 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 37:113 
some proponents of amendments to the Immigration and Nationality 
Act argued?74 Does no-fault divorce increase the number of terminated 
marriages? Will bulk collection of telecommunications information 
about American citizens reveal terrorist plots? Does legalization of 
marijuana increase childhood use of the drug? Will trade sanctions 
affect Russia’s activities in Ukraine? 
The list of questions facing lawmakers is endless, and these 
questions often cut to the heart of their efforts at governance. If 
Congress sought to reduce drug smuggling by enhancing prison terms 
for those convicted of illegal reentry, and the increase had no deterrent 
effect, then Congress made the wrong choice.75 To account for the 
possibility of error, lawmakers have a variety of tools from which to 
select. 
II.     STATIC LAW 
Lawmakers design static law to withstand the test of time. This 
mode of regulating has historically been the default for law. Consider 
canonical historical examples: the Ten Commandments, Hammurabi’s 
Code, and the code of Justinian, each inscribed in stone—a symbol of 
durability and longevity.76 The story of Moses descending from Mount 
Sinai clutching two tablets inscribed with the Decalogue does not 
envision a future where the rule “thou shalt not kill” is revisited based 
on experience with its efficacy and effect. 77 That rule, and others 
believed to be established by divine command, are laws intended for 
eternal application, insensitive to new information, changing 
circumstances, or evolving cultural norms. This method of governing 
constitutes static law. 
 
 74 See 133 CONG. REC. S4992-01 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1987) (statement of Sen. Chiles) 
(proposing “[a] bill to provide for additional criminal penalties for deported aliens who reenter 
the United States”); see also Bindu Jacob, Notes & Comments, Immigration Law: Criminal 
Penalties for Deported Aliens Who Illegally Reenter the United States—Hugo Roman 
Almendarez-Torres v United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998), 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 401, 
414–15 (2000) (describing the history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 provision that 
enhanced criminal penalties for deported aliens who reenter the United States). 
 75 See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1366–68 (2014); Zoey T. Jones, Note, Prescribing Disproportionate 
Punishment: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Illegal Reentry, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1217, 
1234 (2012). 
 76 See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1331 (2003) 
(“In times past, we have fancied law a product of the Deity, and we are still apt to depict it as 
something transcendent, or even broodingly omnipresent, if not divine.”). 
 77 Exodus 20:13 (King James). 
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Static law transcends religious traditions. For parts of the United 
States’ legal history, judges were understood to uncover common law 
legal rules from objectively derivable—thereby permanent—principles.78 
The notion of stare decisis, which retains significant importance and 
resonance today, is also a static approach to law. When judges render 
decisions, they act with the expectation that in the absence of unusual 
circumstances, the decisions they make will remain binding.79 
Static law may appear insensitive to uncertainty. It is better 
understood, however, as a method of addressing uncertainty. Tuning a 
legal rule to new information and circumstances involves costs, and 
static law represents a conclusion that the benefit of legal stability 
outweighs the benefits of crafting a dynamic legal regime. This means 
that lawmakers may select static law as the optimal tool to achieve their 
goals even in circumstances where they recognize that substantial 
uncertainty exists. 
A.     The Structure of Static Law 
Static law is a certain and ascertainable legal rule created without 
provision for future modification of that rule. The theoretical model is 
straightforward: lawmakers identify a problem, then adopt a regulatory 
intervention to address that problem. In doing so, lawmakers intend for 
the intervention to remain fixed, making no special allowances that 
could facilitate a future modification. To the challenge of uncertainty, 
static law answers: if in the future relevant information emerges, existing 
legal rules will continue to apply. 
Statutory, regulatory, and constitutional law each incorporates 
static law. It may manifest at different levels of generality, encompassing 
both rules and standards, with varying degrees of malleability attendant 
 
 78 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780–1860 8 
(1977) (“The equation of common law with a fixed, customary standard meant that judges 
conceived of their role as merely that of discovering and applying preexisting legal rules.”); see 
also Matthew Steilen, Judicial Review and Non-Enforcement at the Founding, 17 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 479, 554 (2014) (“[A]t the turn of the nineteenth century[,] . . . American courts 
turned away from a static private-law regime.”). 
 79 Stare decisis is defined as “[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow 
earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.” Stare Decisis, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). For two discussions of the doctrine in general, see Michael S. 
Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the 
Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (2008), and 
Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 
728 (1988). 
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to each of those legal forms.80 The requirement of driving on the right 
side of the road falls on the rule side of the equation—it is precise and 
not subject to interpretation or nuance.81 The prohibition that a law 
enforcement officer may not use excessive force is, on the other hand, a 
static standard. 82  While the application of that standard to any 
particular circumstance will vary, and the standard itself takes account 
of the totality of the circumstances, it is intended to be a persistent 
limitation on law enforcement activities.83 Static law standards may 
incorporate evolving cultural norms, and thus appear to change. For 
example, the doctrine allowing legal proscription of obscene material is 
based, in part, on “contemporary community standards.”84 But that 
legal standard—that is, the governing legal rule—remains static. 
To be sure, static law does not mean that a legal rule will last 
forever in practice, only that at its inception no provision is made to 
facilitate change. Legal regimes of all stripes end. As James Salzman and 
J.B. Ruhl have observed, “exit is . . . a ubiquitous, inevitable feature of 
governance.” 85  Where a legal regime does not plan for its own 
termination or modification, it can nonetheless evolve through 
amendment or repeal, or it can be overruled by judicial decisions. But 
amending static law often requires significant investment of resources, 
and doing so may destabilize settled expectations that stem from the 
belief that the legal regime will persist.86 
Modern efforts to develop modalities of dynamic law, discussed in 
Part III, respond to the perceived failings in static law, particularly to the 
perception that static law fails to address emerging information.87 While 
 
 80 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 22, 27, 57–69 (1992); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, 562 (1992). 
 81 See 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 652 (“The fundamental rule of traffic is to keep to the 
right even though there is no oncoming traffic.” (footnote omitted)). 
 82 See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 445–55 (2012) (discussing 
excessive force doctrine). This requirement is also an example of a legal standard created by the 
judiciary, as the excessive force limitation is a judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
 83 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 84 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 85 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 32, at 4. 
 86 See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 548 (1991) (“By announcing 
new rules prospectively or by applying them selectively, a court may dodge the stare decisis 
bullet by avoiding the disruption of settled expectations that otherwise prevents us from 
disturbing our settled precedents.”). 
 87 See Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11, at 1464 
(“[A]daptive management was a reaction to the perceived inadequacies of management based 
on pre-decision comprehensive analysis.”). A famous (or notorious, depending on your 
perspective) mechanism by which early environmental law purported to identify appropriate 
regulation in the face of uncertainty was the “precautionary principle.” See, e.g., Michael Ilg, 
Complexity, Environment, and Equitable Competition: A Theory of Adaptive Rule Design, 41 
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it is true that static law is not intended to change, that itself is a response 
to uncertainty, and an appropriate response in some circumstances, 
particularly where the costs imposed by dynamic law outweigh the 
benefits of making law responsive.88 
B.     Static Law Across Context 
Static law abounds in all manner of legal contexts. Consider a few 
examples: The right side driving rule constitutes quintessential static 
law. When legislatures adopted this rule, they envisioned no mechanism 
for the rule changing. Around the world it is exceptionally rare for a 
nation to change its laws governing which side of the road to use.89 
The Constitution creates a blueprint for our federal government. 
Article V of the Constitution allows for amendment, but it does so only 
through a process significantly more onerous than by a majority vote,90 
thereby making constitutional rules the most difficult legal rules to 
change in the United States.91 Only sixteen amendments currently exist, 
in addition to the first ten Amendments in the Bill of Rights,92 which is 
fewer than one amendment for every decade of the Constitution’s 
 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 647, 651–53 (2010). While analysis of the merits of the precautionary principle 
lie beyond the scope of this Article, it would, in essence, resolve uncertainty in favor of 
enhanced environmental protection. See id. Lawmakers could rely on the precautionary 
principle as a rule of decision in formulating any of the varieties of law discussed in this Article. 
 88 See infra Part IV.A. 
 89 See Tom Vanderbilt, Whose Side of the Road Are You on?: For the First Time in Ages, a 
Country Is Switching to Driving on the Left. Should We all Drive on the Same Side?, SALON (Aug. 
14, 2009, 6:19 AM), http://www.salon.com/2009/08/14/driving_on_left. 
 90 U.S. Const. art. V. 
 91 See Justin R. Pidot, Jurisdictional Procedure, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 29 (2012) (citing 
Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review and Interpretation: Have the Courts Become Sovereign 
When Interpreting the Constitution?, in AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY: THE 
JUDICIAL BRANCH 116, 132–33 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2005)). Arguably, 
Article V does envision amendment, and therefore the Constitution could be viewed as a form 
of dynamic law. Because the amendment process is more difficult than the baseline of 
amendment by majority vote, it is better conceived of as an effort in static law. The difficulty of 
amending constitutional provisions does not make them more static law than statutes. The 
definition of static law used in this Article relies on whether lawmakers incorporated means of 
facilitating modification when first enacting law. The challenges imposed by Article V do, 
however, illustrate that static law may be virtually permanent both in terms of the initial 
intentions of the lawmakers and in terms of the experience of the law moving forward. 
 92 See The Constitution: Amendments 11–27, ARCHIVES.GOV, http://www.archives.gov/
exhibits/charters/constitution_amendments_11-27.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2015) (stating 
that first ten Amendments make up the Bill of Rights and that the Eighteenth Amendment was 
repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment). 
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existence. 93  As a result, constitutional provisions like the First 
Amendment’s prohibition on “abridging the freedom of speech” have 
remained a fixed component of the United States’ governing 
architecture.94 
The U.S. Senate ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1990,95 and 
Congress enacted legislation to implement aspects of the Convention in 
1994.96 The Convention allows for no deviations from its absolute 
prohibition on torture. 97  Sanford Levinson has described the 
Convention and other laws prohibiting torture as “establish[ing] a 
Ulyssean contract to be honored whatever the lure of the Sirens, 
including the alleged justifications attached to engaging in war or 
responding to other national emergencies.”98 Then, following the attacks 
on September 11, 2001, the “war on terror” began.99 Neither the future 
occurrence of these transformative events, nor the effects of the 
commitment not to torture, could have been known in 1994. 
Nonetheless, Congress did not provide for modification when it 
implemented the Convention, but rather, it held fast to the normative 
commitment that torture is always bad. 
The General Mining Law of 1872 has governed the process by 
which private individuals can acquire a right to mine on federal land for 
well over a century.100 The conditions in 1872 differed dramatically from 
those of today. The statute includes no mechanism to facilitate 
modification and “[d]espite much contemporary hostility to the Mining 
Law of 1872 and high level political pressure by influential individuals 
and organizations for its repeal, all repeal efforts have failed, and it 
remains the law.”101 Decisions by federal agencies to grant permits 
similarly constitute static law because many such permits lack 
mechanisms for modifying the permit’s terms. For example, when the 
Army Corps of Engineers issues a permit to authorize the filling of a 
 
 93 See A More Perfect Union: The Creation of the U.S. Constitution, ARCHIVES.GOV, 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_history.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2015) 
(stating that the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1788). 
 94 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 95 See 136 CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). 
 96 See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-
236, § 506, 108 Stat. 382 (1994). 
 97 See Sanford Levinson, “Precommitment” and “Postcommitment”: The Ban on Torture in 
the Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2013, 2014 (2003). 
 98 Id. at 2017. 
 99 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004). 
 100 See, e.g., High Country Citizens All. v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 1177, 1179, 1182–85 (10th Cir. 
2006) (citing 30 U.S.C. §§ 21–47 (2012)). 
 101 United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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waterway under section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act,102 the permit 
does not include a provision to require later excavation of that waterway 
should new circumstances emerge.103 
C.     Benefits and Burdens of Static Regulation 
Despite the uncertainty faced by lawmakers, static law affords 
many benefits. Across a suite of circumstances, it may constitute 
optimal policy. 
First, static law entrenches values that society deems to be 
important. Where a value is of weight, uncertainty about the 
consequences of protecting that value may be irrelevant. In other words, 
static law can serve a mast-tying function, committing society to a 
particular legal course irrespective of new information or circumstances, 
and in so doing, static law sends a strong signal about the importance of 
the values it protects. Lawmakers can, of course, later revisit and modify 
a static law. Because of institutional, legal, and political barriers, 
however, such reconsideration is often difficult, particularly where the 
norms embodied in a static law have successfully shaped cultural values. 
Consider the legal prohibition on torture again.104 By committing 
to that prohibition, notwithstanding its uncertain effects, Congress 
reinforced the cultural norm against torture. The effects are apparent. In 
the wake of 9/11, the President could have asked Congress to modify the 
law to permit torture in certain circumstances where, for example, an 
imminent threat to national security existed.105 Some scholars have 
argued that such legislation may even have garnered popular support.106 
Instead, the Administration attempted to work within the existing 
framework by labeling coercive interrogation techniques such as 
waterboarding as something other than torture, an effort that itself has 
been the subject of significant controversy.107 Because the ban on torture 
 
 102 See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 
162 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012)). 
 103 The regulations governing the section 404(a) program are set forth in 33 C.F.R. §§ 320–
338 (2015). 
 104 See David Luban, Essay, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 
1439 (2005). 
 105 Cf. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 2(2), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“No exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other 
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”). 
 106 See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss, 48 
N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 275, 277 (2004). 
 107 See, e.g., Christopher Kutz, Essay, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L. 
REV. 235, 240 (2007). To be clear, the point is not that the Administration’s effort to define 
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was crafted as static law, it established a relatively fixed terrain across 
which later debates about interrogation occurred.108 
Similarly, constitutional rules have moral force, in part because of 
their static nature. The First Amendment, for example, was adopted 
against a backdrop of uncertainty. The drafters of the Amendment 
could only speculate about the importance of facilitating a market place 
of ideas and innovation, or the balance between the benefits of 
protecting speech and the costs to individual or government interests. 
Two hundred years later, these issues remain a subject of spirited 
debate.109 Nonetheless, the First Amendment created a strong cultural 
and legal signal about the social value of protecting speech, and that rule 
has remained unchanged.110 
Second, in many cases, static law saves resources. It may 
accomplish this by eliminating legal uncertainty—even as it fails to 
account for factual uncertainty—and providing a predictable framework 
within which regulated parties can operate. In so doing, static law may 
achieve socially optimal outcomes even in circumstances where the 
adopted rule is not itself optimal. This will be true when the costs—both 
economic and otherwise—associated with modifying a legal rule 
 
waterboarding as something other than torture was successful. The United States government 
has itself previously viewed the practices as constituting torture. See Luke Whelan, New 
Documents Show the US Called Waterboarding Torture During World War II, MOTHER JONES 
(Dec. 17, 2014, 8:05 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/12/waterboarding-
torture-japan-world-war-ii. Rather, the static law structure of anti-torture law created a baseline 
against which the Administration acted in trying to justify its practices. 
 108 The Endangered Species Act’s (ESA) prohibition on the taking of endangered species 
constitutes another example of static law’s role in inculcating and enforcing norms. See 
Endangered Species Act of 1973, sec. 9, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2012)). Section 9 of the Act embodied a social value that 
human activity should not extinguish other forms of life. The rule was written in absolute 
terms, and early in the statute’s life, the Supreme Court explained that “Congress has spoken in 
the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of 
affording endangered species the highest of priorities.” Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 
194 (1978). Although Congress also enacted section 10 of the ESA to allow certain takings of 
endangered species, preserving species from extinction remains a popular and important 
policy. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT POLL 2 (2011), http://ht.ly/4appW. 
 109 For example, both the legality and propriety of criminalizing revenge pornography—the 
act of distributing graphic sexual images of someone without their consent—has been a recent 
subject of considerable debate. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Revenge Porn and Freedom of Expression: 
Legislative Pushback to an Online Weapon of Emotional and Reputational Destruction, 24 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 700–01 (2014); Danielle K. Citron & Mary A. 
Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 347–49 (2014); Ian Farrell et 
al., Colorado’s New Revenge Porn Statute is Good Law and Sound Policy, HUFFINGTON POST: 
BLOG (June 1, 2014, 11:25 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-farrell/colorados-new-
revenge-por_b_5427703.html. 
 110 This is, of course, an oversimplification, as legal doctrine surrounding the First 
Amendment has evolved through judicial decisions. Compare, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 
343 (2003) (upholding a Virginia statute criminalizing cross burning), with R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating a St. Paul, Minnesota hate crime ordinance). 
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outweigh the benefits that accrue from better tailoring that rule to 
changing circumstances or new information.111 The costs avoided by 
static law take two forms. Fixed rules reduce the risks of investment. 
This is a central benefit of the rule of law. A nation with a stable and 
certain set of legal rules will attract foreign investment and investors will 
demand lower interest rates.112 In other words, the very act of creating 
static law has salutary effects to the extent that those affected by the 
regulation believe in the stability of the regime, at least during the 
period relevant to an investment decision.113 People make investments 
based on existing legal rules, and static law honors these investments 
with future certainty.114 Static law also avoids costs of transitioning 
between legal regimes. When rules change, those affected must change 
their behavior in response. Depending on the magnitude of the change, 
this can itself impose substantial costs.115 
Consider again the example of the rule requiring drivers to travel 
on the right side of the road. Unlike the First Amendment and the 
Convention Against Torture,116 no normative commitment adheres to 
this rule, and as discussed, evidence suggests that the United States 
follows the worse rule because driving on the right side correlates with a 
greater number of accidents.117 Nonetheless, relying on static law to 
establish the right-side driving rule also created significant benefits. For 
example, choosing a uniform and certain standard may have facilitated 
 
 111 By using the language of costs and benefits, I do not mean to invoke purely economic 
cost-benefit analysis of the type critiqued by scholars such as Lisa Heinzerling and Frank 
Ackerman. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 207–08 (2004); Frank Ackerman & Lisa 
Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1553, 1558–60 (2002). There are circumstances where a traditional economic analysis 
would indicate that stable but poorly calibrated legal rules will outperform those that are more 
flexible and responsive. Indeed, traditional economics might overvalue stability because 
dynamic law will often benefit environmental values that are difficult to monetize. Id. 
 112 See Gaëtan Verhoosel, Foreign Direct Investment and Legal Constraints on Domestic 
Environmental Policies: Striking a “Reasonable” Balance Between Stability and Change, 29 LAW 
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 451, 453 (1998). 
 113 Static law may also reduce investment in lobbying for modification of an existing legal 
rule because achieving such modification is substantially more difficult that adjusting dynamic 
law. Economic and social capital that might be expended in seeking such a change can thus be 
put to other productive uses. 
 114 Investment under existing legal rules also serves to generate de facto static law because 
rules that have engendered substantial investment become politically harder to change. See 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Essay, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1218–20 
(2001). 
 115 See Gubler, supra note 12, at 139 (“Laws may become entrenched because the more 
people that rely on them, the more valuable they become and the less likely they are to be 
displaced, even by a potentially superior law.”). 
 116 See discussion supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
 117 See LEEMING, supra note 38. 
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the spread of the automobile.118 It may have encouraged car companies 
to invest substantial resources in designing and building cars, confident 
that these cars would not suddenly become obsolete. It also may have 
facilitated purchasing decisions by individuals and companies because 
they could be confident that their investment would not suddenly 
become functionally useless. The benefits of selecting a fixed rule—
driving on the right-hand side of the road—likely outweigh the costs of 
the small uptick in traffic accidents associated with that rule. Moreover, 
switching rules would likely incur substantial transitional costs. 
Companies would have to redesign models and production facilities, 
and individuals would have to abandon existing vehicles in favor of new 
ones. Moreover, during the transition period, road accidents would 
likely increase as people grew accustomed to the new regime. 
Third, static law can create incentives for private market actors to 
engage in pro-social conduct. This is illustrated by many of the so-called 
“command-and-control” approaches to environmental law. 119  By 
instantiating a legal rule with firm application, the government 
encourages regulated parties to channel energy and resources to 
developing means of conforming to that rule. This is just what occurred 
when Congress banned chlorofluorocarbons through the Clean Air Act 
amendments of 1990.120 Congress faced considerable uncertainty about 
the economic repercussions of a ban, but nonetheless adopted a 
stringent and specific timetable for eliminating these substances that 
deplete the ozone layer. 121  Industry responded by developing 
commercially viable alternatives.122 
 
 118 It is not impossible, however, to change which side of the road drivers use. In 2009, the 
island nation of Samoa did just that. See Vanderbilt, supra note 89. That decision was not 
motivated by concern for public safety. Rather, Samoa believed that it could import cars more 
cheaply from Australia and New Zealand, which require driving on the left, than from 
countries that drive on the right. Id. 
 119 I have not identified an agreed upon term in the literature to describe non-adaptive 
decision-making and have selected “static law” because it captures a primary axis along which it 
diverges from adaptive management. The command-and-control “approach typically proceeds 
by imposing rigid standards of conduct on individual pollution sources . . . backed up by 
sanctions designed to assure full compliance with such standards by each source.” James E. 
Krier & Richard B. Stewart, Using Economic Analysis in Teaching Environmental Law: The 
Example of Common Law Rules, 1 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 13, 15 n.3 (1980). 
 120 Clean Air Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012)). 
 121 See id. (codified as amended at § 7407); see also Clare Langley-Hawthorne, An 
International Market for Transferable Gas Emission Permits to Promote Climate Change, 9 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 261, 276–77 (1998) (identifying a concern about the uncertainty of 
economic effects of ozone depletion and development of alternative technologies). 
 122 See Elizabeth R. DeSombre, The Experience of the Montreal Protocol: Particularly 
Remarkable, and Remarkably Particular, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 49, 59 (2001). Title VI 
of the Clean Air Act was the United States’ means of accomplishing the goals established in the 
Montreal Protocol. See tit. VI, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended §§ 7671–7671q). 
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Fourth, static law reduces the burden of governing. Lawmakers 
face abundant demands for their attention. Static law reduces these 
demands because it allows lawmakers to address problems only once. 
This benefit may be particularly acute in the context of politically 
charged, divisive decisions. In such circumstances, a lawmaking body 
may take significant time to overcome political opposition. Deciding 
once, rather than in an iterative fashion, may be the only realistic means 
of addressing a problem in such circumstances. 
Administrative agencies face similar political and resource 
constraints. The Administrative Procedure Act, for example, imposes 
process requirements on agency decisions that can consume substantial 
resources.123 Where applicable, the National Environmental Policy Act 
and the Endangered Species Act also impose resource intensive 
procedural requirements. 124  The cost to agencies associated with 
creating dynamic law may, in some circumstances, outweigh the 
benefits of creating a legal regime responsive to new information. 
The primary drawback of static law is encapsulated in its name. 
Static law is static. It lacks nimbleness and flexibility, and may be 
particularly unsuited to governing complex and chaotic situations. 
Where lawmakers deploy static law to govern such circumstances, 
standards, programs, and other legal interventions may become 
outdated but nonetheless persist because of the difficulty of changing 
static law once it is created. These changes in circumstances may arise 
because of new information, new technologies, or as Hannah Wiseman 
has explained, because the scale of a regulated activity has increased.125 
Even when lawmakers agree that a static law regime needs to be 
amended—or abandoned altogether—it may nonetheless persist because 
lawmakers lack the resources or attention to address the matter.126 
Reliance on outdated laws is not only ineffective, but also undermines 
the public’s faith in their government.127 
 
 123 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 124 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012). 
 125 Wiseman, supra note 28, at 238. As Brigham Daniels has explained, “institutions built to 
address yesterday’s problems become today’s obstacles to change.” Brigham Daniels, Emerging 
Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515, 522 (2007). Daniels examines a particular 
regulatory context—managing common resources—and explains that the desire for stable 
institutions to govern such resources can create what he terms “tragic institutions,” which 
burden future efforts to manage those resources in light of changing values or new information. 
See id. at 539. 
 126 Wiseman, supra note 28, at 272. 
 127 Moreover, the difficulty of modifying static law may mean that change will occur only in 
the wake of extreme circumstances. Cf. id. at 241 (noting that the “regulatory lag” associated 
with unconventional oil and gas development “partially results from the tendency of 
policymakers, agencies, and stakeholders to rely upon dramatic incidents and major 
technological modifications . . . as triggers of needed regulatory change”). Following dramatic 
 
PIDOT.37.1.3 (Do Not Delete) 10/26/2015 1:05 PM 
140 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 37:113 
Static law may also be ill-suited to the problems faced in mature 
regulatory contexts. When lawmakers first turn their attention to a set 
of problems (e.g., environmental problems), static law may achieve 
considerable success. J.B. Ruhl made this observation in reference to 
command-and-control mechanisms, which generally constitute static 
law rules that govern the discharge of pollution: the first generation of 
environmental regulation achieved success by “pick[ing] the low-
hanging fruit . . . . [F]or example, it has targeted emissions from 
smokestacks and discharge pipes, disposal of wastes in landfills, 
transportation of hazardous chemicals, and similar discrete, easily-
identified sources of environmental harm.”128 Ruhl suggested that static 
law poorly addresses the thornier problems that remain. This same 
observation applies to other contexts. Lawmakers sensibly begin with 
those problems that are easiest to address, and such problems may lend 
themselves to static law solutions. After more than two centuries of 
governance, American law may have solved many such problems, and 
what remains may require the dynamic approaches discussed in the next 
Part. 
III.     DYNAMIC LAW 
Static legal rules, sensible when enacted, may become out of date, 
outliving their usefulness. Even unconstitutional laws remain on the 
books long after they become unenforceable.129 Even popular culture 
understands that laws may persist too long. In the hit television show 
Parks and Recreation, the town of Pawnee, Indiana has an obviously 
unconstitutional law governing city council elections. On the eve of 
such an election, the lead character is told by a voting official that “[a] 
final tally [of votes] within one percent will trigger an automatic 
recount. In the event of an exact tie, the seat is awarded to the male 
candidate and the female candidate is put in jail.” 130 The official 
 
and vivid regulatory failure, the government may feel pressure to act quickly to change existing 
programs. But such rushed action will itself often lack nuance. 
 128 J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is it Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
21, 21 (2005) [hereinafter Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management]. 
 129 See, e.g., William Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the 
Revival of “Unconstitutional” Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1902, 1907 (1993); Hillary Greene, 
Note, Undead Laws: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in Non-Criminal 
Litigation, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 174 (1997); Brian Palmer, How a Bill Becomes Not a 
Law: What Happens to Unconstitutional State Laws? Can They Just Stay on the Books Forever?, 
SLATE (Apr. 4, 2013, 3:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/
2013/04/north_carolina_state_religion_bill_does_unconstitutional_legislation_disappear.html. 
 130 Parks and Recreation: Win, Lose, or Draw (NBC television broadcast May 10, 2012). 
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acknowledges, “I don’t think it would hold up in court, but it is city 
law.”131 This fictional account mirrors reality. Static law sticks around.132 
Permanence has advantages. So too does flexibility and dynamism. 
Dynamic law enables lawmakers to craft regulatory interventions to 
respond to new information and shifting conditions. 
This Part provides an account of mechanisms by which legal rules 
can respond to new information, identifying three primary modes of 
dynamic law. First, durational regulation promotes whole-cloth 
amendment and reconsideration of law after it is adopted by creating 
periodic opportunities for review. 133  It achieves this end without 
creating specialized procedural rules that are calibrated to emerging 
information. Rather, durational regulation creates open-ended 
opportunities for the amendment and repeal of existing rules. Second, 
adaptive regulation creates a process that is internal to a legal 
framework and allows for reconsideration of that framework’s rules.134 
This reconsideration could occur, and perhaps ideally would occur, by a 
subsidiary body specially charged with managing the legal regime. It 
may also occur by the initial lawmaking body itself. Third, contingent 
regulation eschews process-based approaches to dynamism, and instead 
incorporates mechanisms that provide for automatic substantive 
changes to legal rules based on foreseeable future conditions.135 
From a theoretical perspective, this typology recognizes that law 
can respond to uncertainty either internally or externally. In other 
words, a legal regime can itself include mechanisms by which the rules 
attendant to that regime can change—the internal approach of adaptive 
regulation and contingent regulation—or a legal regime can include 
mechanisms that encourage lawmakers to amend or replace that 
regime—the external approach of durational regulation. Where a 
dynamic law regime includes internal mechanisms for change, those 
mechanisms may be procedural or substantive in nature. In other 
words, dynamism can include specific, substantive adjustments to 
governing legal rules if certain events come to pass—contingent 
regulation—or it can specify procedures for developing such 
adjustments—adaptive regulation. 
Each approach—internal and external, procedural and 
substantive—has advantages. This Part examines each mechanism in 
turn. 
 
 131 Id. 
 132 See sources cited supra note 129. 
 133 See infra Part III.B. 
 134 See infra Part III.B. 
 135 See infra Part III.C. 
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A.     Durational Regulation 
Durational regulation addresses uncertainty by facilitating periodic 
opportunities for the amendment or repeal of existing rules. The 
underlying legal rules may resemble static law. Durational regulation 
contains no specialized set of procedures to govern the modification of 
rules. Rather, lawmakers that promulgate durational regulation can 
intervene in response to new information or changing circumstances, 
and durational regulation facilitates that intervention. In other words, 
unlike static law, which is intended to remain a permanent fixture in the 
architecture of the legal system, durational regulation is intended only 
for temporary or durational use.136 
1.     The Structure of Durational Regulation 
Durational regulation involves the open-ended reconsideration, 
revision, or repeal of existing rules by lawmakers to address new 
information and emerging circumstances. Such a process differs from 
adaptive regulation because it involves no predefined procedures by 
which new information would trigger reconsideration, and it differs 
from contingent regulation because it involves no pre-commitment as 
to the substance of future changes in a legal rule. Instead, lawmakers 
simply make new decisions as new decisions become desirable, in 
consideration of any information they believe is relevant. The problem, 
of course, is that making decisions in a democracy is difficult and time 
consuming, in no small part because lawmakers face nearly endless 
demands on their time and attention. Durational regulation seeks to 
overcome those barriers. Sometimes it accomplishes that task by 
reducing the difficulty of decision-making, either by relaxing legal 
constraints or by creating periodic opportunities for lawmakers to 
reconsider rules should they so desire. Other times durational regulation 
creates significant incentives for lawmakers to revisit existing rules—
incentives designed to counteract barriers to decision-making.137 To the 
challenge of uncertainty, durational regulation answers: if relevant 
information emerges in the future, lawmakers should intervene to 
consider any information they deem appropriate, and should take any 
steps they deem necessary. 
 
 136 The term “durational regulation” draws its origin from the original term “duration 
clause,” which, in one of its more common forms, is included in sunset provisions. For a 
discussion of duration clauses, see Gersen, supra note 20, at 248. 
 137 See infra notes 145–66 and accompanying text. 
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Durational regulation can function by reducing obstacles to 
decision-making by relaxing legal constraints on the decision-making 
process, including constraints imposed by process rules. Such relaxation 
decreases the cost to lawmakers of revisiting their decisions, thus 
making amendment or repeal more likely. Durational regulation can 
also function by requiring lawmakers to convene at specified times to 
discuss any changes to a legal rule that may be required. Such 
opportunities place amendment or repeal on the agenda, which helps to 
overcome the inertia that can arise from the multifarious obligations 
facing government actors. 
Alternatively, durational regulation can leave in place the existing 
architecture by which reconsideration of law occurs, and instead can 
create incentives for lawmakers to overcome the barriers they face. A 
longstanding mechanism for creating such incentives is the practice of 
establishing deadlines by which existing legal rules must be revisited, 
and which create either real-world or political consequences for 
inaction. Deadlines can be hard or soft, depending on the consequences 
that would occur if a deadline is missed. 
Sunset provisions create a form of “penalty default” for lawmakers 
by imposing hard deadlines by which lawmakers must revisit decisions 
before earlier decisions expire on their own terms.138 Ian Ayres and 
Robert Gertner originally conceived of penalty defaults in the context of 
default rules for contracts—rules that neither party to a contract would 
prefer to be bound by—thereby “giv[ing] at least one party to the 
contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore 
to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.”139 Sunset 
provisions operate similarly by creating a default regime in which the 
absence of further lawmaking causes a legal rule to disappear entirely. 
Assuming that lawmakers believe legal rules serve important purposes, 
 
 138 See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 20, at 253; Wiseman, supra note 28, at 272. Not every 
provision terminating a legal rule after a certain period of time constitutes durational 
regulation. Sometimes, a temporary legal intervention is all that is required to address a 
problem. At other times, a temporary intervention may have different, desirable consequences 
when compared to a permanent intervention. For example, there is evidence that a temporary 
reduction in taxes for stock dividends that are distributed to shareholders may boost the size of 
dividend distributions more than a permanent tax cut. See Steven A. Bank, Dividends and Tax 
Policy in the Long Run, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 536 (2007). In such circumstances, the 
temporary nature of a legal rule is not serving the purpose of facilitating reconsideration, and as 
such, the rule does not constitute durational regulation as the term is used in this Article. 
 139 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). Penalty defaults are not a perfect analogy for 
durational regulation. Durational regulation creates incentives for decision-making at a later 
date in order to reveal the preferences of lawmakers at that time based on information that was 
unavailable at the moment that a legal rule was initially created. Penalty defaults in contract 
law, on the other hand, promote additional decision-making at the inception of a contract on 
the basis of information already in the possession of at least one of the parties. 
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sunset provisions impose real costs for failure to act, and therefore 
create positive incentives—which are sometimes substantial—for 
decision-making to occur before an important legal rule expires. 
Deadlines can also be softer in nature, decoupled from the real-
world consequences of automatic rule termination, and instead can 
involve a commitment to make a decision by a certain time, thereby 
imposing a political cost for failure to act. For example, a statute may 
require an administrative agency to reconsider an earlier decision within 
a set number of years.140 These statutory deadlines “are usually deemed 
directory,” rather than mandatory. 141  In circumstances where an 
agency’s violation of a statutory deadline becomes extreme, the 
Administrative Procedure Act provides a backstop by allowing affected 
parties to sue an agency that has “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed” action. 142  Even unenforceable deadlines, however, serve a 
function. They create political and public pressure for action. 
Not all deadlines constitute durational regulation. The purpose of 
durational regulation, like other forms of dynamic law, is to make law 
responsive to emerging information. Lawmakers may deploy deadlines 
for other purposes. The “fiscal cliff” of 2013 is one example.143 In 2011, 
Congress increased the borrowing authority of the United States to 
avoid a government default on federal loans, but it proved unable to 
agree to a package of spending cuts and tax increases necessary to avoid 
the need for further borrowing.144 Instead, Congress enacted the Budget 
Control Act, which included automatic, across-the-board budget cuts to 
 
 140 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (b)(1)(B) (2012) (“The Administrator shall, at least every 8 
years, review and, if appropriate, revise such standards [of performance for new stationary 
sources (buildings, structures, facilities, or installations) of air pollutants] . . . .”). 
 141 Trans Fleet Enters., Inc. v. Boone, 987 F.2d 1000, 1005 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Even statutory 
time limits for agency action are usually deemed directory.”); see CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 33 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 8387 (1st ed. 2015) (“Review of 
delay takes on the search for negligent omission or reckless disregard of the administrative 
duty.”). 
 142 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). Environmental plaintiffs have enjoyed significant success in 
suing for violations of statutory deadlines contained in the Endangered Species Act, perhaps in 
part because the deadlines are so short and the courts provide the relevant agencies relatively 
little wiggle room. See generally Benjamin Jesup, Endless War or End This War? The History of 
Deadline Litigation Under Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act and the Multi-District 
Litigation Settlements, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 327 (2013) (recounting the history of deadline suits 
under the Endangered Species Act). 
 143 See Lori Montgomery & Rosalind S. Helderman, Congress Approves “Fiscal Cliff” 
Measure, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
house-members-meet-to-review-senate-passed-cliff-deal/2013/01/01/6e4373cc-5435-11e2-bf3e-
76c0a789346f_story.html. 
 144 See Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2068¬69 
(2013). 
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programs favored by both Democrats and Republicans.145 Those cuts—
referred to as “sequestration”—were to take effect on January 2, 2013.146 
Sequestration resembles the deadlines discussed above, but the purpose 
of sequestration differed. Congress designed these spending cuts to 
force a political compromise, not to facilitate responsiveness to new 
information.147 Therefore, sequestration did not constitute durational 
regulation. 
2.     Durational Regulation Across Context 
Durational regulation has occurred throughout American law. 
Probably the most common form is the sunset provision. This strategy 
stretches back as far as the framing of the Constitution. Article I 
requires Congress to appropriate money for the military no less than 
every two years. 148  In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton 
explained that the two-year appropriation limit promoted congressional 
deliberation: “The Legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this 
provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the 
propriety of keeping a military force on foot.”149 In other words, as 
Jacob Gersen has explained, the Constitution forces Congress “to 
reconsider the need for a standing military, and incorporate 
information about changing circumstances into legislative 
deliberations.”150 
Federal statutes sometimes include similar provisions. Such 
“temporary legislation” was common early in American history, but has 
become less commonplace.151 Congress does continue to use sunset 
provisions on occasion. For example, the Public Safety and Recreational 
Firearms Use Protection Act banned the manufacture and transfer of 
assault weapons and included a sunset provision that caused the ban to 
 
 145 Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.); see BILL HENIFF JR. ET AL., CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT OF 2011 4 (2011) (describing Budget Control 
Act’s goal of forcing lawmakers to reach a compromise on spending). 
 146 125 Stat. 240. 
 147 See HENIFF, supra note 145. 
 148 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power to appropriate money “[t]o 
raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer 
Term than two Years”). 
 149 THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 150 See Gersen, supra note 20, at 251. 
 151 See id. 
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expire after a decade.152 During that decade, Congress directed the 
Attorney General to “study the effect” of various provisions of the law, 
including the assault weapons ban, and “determine their impact, if any, 
on violent and drug trafficking crime.”153 This legislation provides a 
useful illustration of durational regulation. Congress created a means of 
generating information about the efficacy of the assault weapons ban 
and sought to ensure reconsideration of the ban by means of its 
automatic expiration. The assault weapons ban also provides a 
cautionary tale about durational regulation. Sometimes, politics gets in 
the way, and the impending termination of an important legal regime 
fails to actually compel its reconsideration and reauthorization. Rather, 
the regime does in fact terminate.154 
Congress also sets deadlines for administrative agencies, although 
these provisions typically function as softer deadlines. For example, 
section 111 of the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to revisit technology-
based standards for categories of stationary sources every eight years.155 
Section 111 does not, however, operate as a sunset provision to 
automatically terminate the standards after eight years.156 The deadline 
has the effect, however, of creating public, political, and legal pressure 
for the EPA to update the standards to account for new information. 
Similarly, the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning 
Act157 requires the U.S. Forest Service to issue fifteen-year management 
plans for each national forest.158 
Forms of durational regulation other than those that contain 
deadlines also exist in practice. The Federal Reserve’s management of 
 
 152 Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
§§ 110101–110106, 108 Stat. 1796, 2000 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(31), 922(w) 
(2000) (repealed 2004)). 
 153 Id. at § 110104. 
 154 The assault weapons ban indeed terminated in this manner. See Joel Roberts, Assault 
Weapon Ban Expires, CBS NEWS (Sept. 13, 2004, 9:42 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
assault-weapon-ban-expires. The termination of the assault weapons ban could be viewed as a 
successful use of dynamic law. If one viewed the results of the Attorney General’s study as 
supporting repeal of the ban, then Congress’s failure to reauthorize the ban—either in its 
original form or in a form modified by reference to the knowledge generated by the study—
embodies an appropriate change in law based on new information. The entrenched political 
dynamics of gun control suggest, however, that information production had less to do with the 
expiration of the ban than ideology. 
 155 Clean Air Act, § 111, 69. Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7411(b)(1)(B) (2012)) (“The Administrator shall, at least every 8 years, review and, if 
appropriate, revise such standards.”); see also Wiseman, supra note 28, at 291–92. 
 156 See § 7411. 
 157 Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 
Stat. 476 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614 (2012)). 
 158 See § 1604(f)(5). Congress has repeatedly passed laws allowing the Forest Service to 
continue to enforce outdated laws. See, e.g., Montanans for Multiple Use v. Barbouletos, 568 
F.3d 225, 227–28 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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monetary policy is a good example. By statute, the Federal Open Market 
Committee, a subdivision of the Federal Reserve, must meet “at least 
four times each year.”159 These prescribed meetings create periodic 
opportunities for the Committee to discuss and modify monetary 
policy. The ability to make such modification is further facilitated 
because the operations of the Committee are largely exempt from 
ordinary administrative process requirements,160 including from typical 
avenues of congressional oversight. 161  In other words, a specific 
substantive area of law—monetary policy—has been entrusted to a 
governing body that is required to meet periodically and whose 
decision-making processes are subject to a preferential set of procedural 
rules. That body is then charged with establishing and modifying policy 
to account for new information and changing circumstances. 
International treaty regimes provide a second example. In many 
cases, after the enactment of a multilateral treaty, the parties convene 
after a specified period at a conference of the parties (or “COP”) at 
which any issue affecting the treaty can be discussed and resolved.162 
The issues addressed at a COP are far-ranging, and typically the treaties 
themselves do not provide an exhaustive list. Rather, the COP creates an 
opportunity for the signatories to the treaty to gather and address 
emerging issues.163 
Congress’s rules governing deliberation over the federal budget 
constitutes a third example. Few decision-making bodies have a 
reputation as poor as Congress, and in part that stems from Congress’s 
inability to take action.164 One obstacle to congressional action is the 
Senate procedural rule that requires a supermajority vote in order to 
pass most legislation.165 That supermajority rule can result in lengthy 
 
 159 See 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (2012). The current practice of the Committee is to meet eight 
times each year. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Open Market 
Committee, http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 
2015). 
 160 See, e.g., Raichle v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 34 F.2d 910, 913–14 (2d Cir. 1929); Steven 
M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial 
Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 477–78 (2009). 
 161 See 5 U.S.C. § 807 (2012) (exempting monetary policy from Congressional review). 
 162 See Annecoos Wiersema, The New International Law-Makers? Conferences of the Parties 
to Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 231, 235–36 (2009). 
 163 See id. 
 164 See 6% Think Congress Is Doing a Good or Excellent Job, RASMUSSEN REP. (Aug. 5, 2014), 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/archive/mood_of_america_archive/
congressional_performance/6_think_congress_is_doing_a_good_or_excellent_job. A 
Rasmussen poll conducted in July of 2014 reveals both the perception that congress performs 
poorly and that a majority of respondents believed that “passing good legislation is a more 
important role for Congress than preventing bad legislation from becoming law.” Id. 
 165 See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi & Jeff VanDam, The Filibuster and Reconciliation: The Future of 
Majoritarian Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 261, 266 (2013). 
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periods of inaction. Delays significantly undermine the benefits of 
budgeting, particularly because budgeting involves substantial 
uncertainty “on ‘both’ sides of the ledger,” and because both tax 
revenues and necessary expenditures may exceed projections. 166 
Congress enacted the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974 to facilitate budgeting and to make it more responsive to 
new information. 167  The Act, among other things, eliminated the 
Senate’s supermajority rule when applied to budget resolutions, and 
replaced it with a reconciliation process that allowed no more than 
twenty hours of debate.168 In other words, with respect to budgeting, 
Congress has reduced the barriers to decision-making. 
3.     Benefits and Burdens of Durational Regulation 
When lawmakers revisit decisions, they can incorporate emerging 
information and address new circumstances. This allows the law to 
remain current. Durational regulation nonetheless imposes costs by 
requiring lawmakers themselves to take further action. 
A few scholars have lauded the potential for durational regulation 
to enable legal experimentation, particularly deadline-based durational 
regulation.169 Sunset provisions create a natural trial period for a legal 
rule during which additional information about that rule and its context 
can be gathered. That approach may have particular utility when 
lawmakers enter a new field of regulation, or when they respond to a 
new problem. As Jacob Gersen explains, “[b]ecause temporary 
legislation reduces background uncertainty and mitigates certain forms 
 
 166 David Kamin, Risky Returns: Accounting for Risk in the Federal Budget, 88 IND. L.J. 723, 
731 (2013). The federal government cannot spend more money than appropriated by Congress. 
Where emerging events require spending of money in excess of appropriations, Congress 
appropriates additional funds through a supplemental appropriations bill. See, e.g., Press 
Release, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D–Cal.), U.S. Sen., Feinstein Remarks in Support of 
Supplemental Appropriations Bill (July 31, 2014), http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/press-releases?ID=776864e4-fd96-4024-ad06-c86833e749f0.  
 167 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 
Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012)). 
 168 See Jacobi & VanDam, supra note 165, at 292–303. 
 169 See Gersen, supra note 20, at 253 (arguing that temporary laws provide concrete 
advantages over permanent laws from an informational perspective); Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting 
Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1067 (2011) (criticizing the political and economic costs of 
temporary rules, but acknowledging the importance of experimental rules in the face of 
emergencies or uncertainty); Romano, supra note 68, at 88. Jessica Owley’s consideration of 
“term conservation easements,” which would require easement holders to reconsider terms 
after a time interval, identifies similar advantages. See Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a 
Changing World: A Call for the End of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
121 (2011). 
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of cognitive bias, it is likely to provide far more advantages than 
drawbacks as a legislative response to newly recognized risks.” 170 
Moreover, expressly experimental rules may facilitate agreement 
because the anticipated cost of complying with a rule for only a short 
period of time may be relatively insignificant. 
Durational regulation, then, may prove most effective in situations 
where uncertainty is at its apex, where the costs of stagnation are high, 
and where the costs of change are relatively low. Where an agency has 
inadequate information to even identify the likely consequences of a 
new legal rule, planning for contingencies at the outset—as contingent 
regulation would require—may prove difficult, resource-intensive, or 
impossible. 
Durational regulation also serves a salutary signaling purpose. One 
problem created by static law is that it creates an appearance of 
permanence that can mislead regulated parties. Durational regulation 
puts regulated parties on notice that applicable legal rules are likely to 
change. Notice may lead to more sensible investment decisions or 
choices that hedge against the cost of future modifications of legal rules. 
Durational regulation is not without flaws, however. Laws tend to 
become path-dependent, meaning that temporary rules may become 
permanent by default, even where adjustment would be beneficial.171 
The history of the Voting Rights Act may present an example. Section 5 
of the Act requires political jurisdictions with a history of 
discrimination to seek approval from the Attorney General of the 
United States, before altering voting rules.172 Congress created a formula 
to identify those states that would be subject to section 5 and attached a 
sunset provision to the formula to facilitate future adjustments. The 
formula, however, proved sticky and Congress did not make 
adjustments to incorporate new information. For this reason, the 
Supreme Court invalidated the provision that contained the formula in 
Shelby County v. Holder. 173  Moreover, in some circumstances, 
lawmakers may face significant political obstacles to effectively 
implementing durational regulation because iterative decision-making 
processes provide opportunities for “regulated [entities to] develop[] 
lasting contacts and coalitions” designed to thwart future regulatory 
efforts.174 
 
 170 Gersen, supra note 20, at 248. 
 171 See Gubler, supra note 12, at 134. 
 172 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended 
at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012)). These jurisdictions can, alternatively, file a lawsuit seeking a 
declaration approving of the new procedure. Id. 
 173 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
 174 Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the 
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1713 (2008). 
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Durational regulation, particularly deadline-based durational 
regulation, also imposes hefty burdens on lawmakers.175 Those burdens 
fall with particular severity on administrative agencies that are required 
to comply with resource-consuming processes, such as notice-and-
comment rulemaking, and are faced with the prospect of judicial 
challenges after each iterated decision. This dynamic produces a 
perverse political economy for agencies: Permanent rules consume 
fewer resources and limit litigation to a single instance, but such rules 
do not account for new information. Temporary rules increase resource 
costs and litigation risks, but produce a better legal regime. Zachery 
Gubler has proposed a possible solution to this problem, arguing that 
courts should provide increased deference to agencies that promulgate 
temporary rules,176 although the textual basis for differing standards of 
judicial deference in the Administrative Procedure Act is unclear. 
Agency capture may also occur where durational regulation 
involves a specialized decision-maker tasked with continuously 
updating a particular legal regime.177 Narrowing an agency’s jurisdiction 
to facilitate consistent attention to a particular problem increases the 
likelihood that a small group of private parties will be the primary voices 
heard by that agency and a primary source of future staff.178 Such 
dynamics may distort decision-making.179 For example, federal law tasks 
Regional Fishery Management Councils with setting annual catch limits, 
based on evolving information, to ensure that yields are sustainable.180 
These councils primarily interact with the fishing industry and—
 
 175 Private parties may also face increased burdens, as those interested in durational 
regulation will need to deploy resources to advocate on behalf of their interests when a 
regulation’s duration has passed. Cf. Owley, supra note 169, at 169 (identifying concern that 
term conservation easements may increase transaction costs). 
 176 Gubler, supra note 12, at 134. Gubler explains that the political economy benefits from 
enhanced deference. If time-limited rules have a better chance of surviving judicial review than 
permanent rules, interest groups that favor a policy will also favor a time-limited rule. Id. If 
interest groups support time-limited rules, that will pressure agencies to pursue such an 
approach. Id. 
 177 Agency capture refers to the ability of interest groups to coopt agency decision-making 
processes. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 22–23 (2010); John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust 
Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724–25 (1986). 
 178 See Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 4 (2010). 
 179 Cf. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (“[S]pecialization will produce a court with tunnel vision, with judges 
who are overly sympathetic to the policies furthered by the law that they administer or who are 
susceptible to ‘capture’ by the bar that regular[ly] practices before them.”). 
 180 See 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (2012); see generally Roger Fleming et al., Twenty-Eight Years and 
Counting: Can the Magnuson-Stevens Act Deliver on Its Conservation Promise?, 28 VT. L. REV. 
579 (2004). 
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consistent with similar concerns about agency capture—have been 
criticized for inadequately protecting fish stocks.181 
In some circumstances, durational regulation strategies may face 
political difficulties because they can appear costlier than permanent 
rules when reviewed under current accounting practices. In considering 
legislative sunset provisions, George Yin explains that the method of 
projecting budgetary impact of any proposed legislation systematically 
disadvantages time-limited laws.182 This effect occurs because the cost of 
permanent legislation is assessed over a “budget window period,” which 
is typically five or ten fiscal years, and budget analyses ignore all costs 
after that window.183 This artificially reduces the perceived cost of 
permanent legislation as compared to temporary legislation.184 This is 
not a theoretical flaw with durational regulation, but is rather a practical 
difficulty facing lawmakers who are seeking to implement this 
strategy.185 
B.     Adaptive Regulation 
Like durational regulation, adaptive regulation facilitates 
reconsideration of legal rules. Adaptive regulation has been popularized 
by the glut of adaptive management programs that have been 
incorporated into environmental and natural resources law. It 
incorporates specialized procedures that require reconsideration of legal 
rules in response to new information or changing circumstances. 
1.     The Structure of Adaptive Regulation 
Adaptive regulation creates procedures within a legal framework 
that require reconsideration of the substantive rules. This is 
accomplished as follows: Lawmakers create a legal rule and attach a 
process to that rule by which reconsideration will occur as new 
information becomes available. During such reconsideration, the legal 
rule can be modified in whatever way is deemed appropriate. Adaptive 
 
 181 See JOSH EAGLE ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
COUNCILS 27–28 (2003); Katrina Mariam Wyman, from Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the 
Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 180 (2005); Fleming, supra 180, at 613. 
 182 George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal 
Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 186–87 (2009). 
 183 Id. at 178. 
 184 Id. at 180. 
 185 Even in the absence of this accounting-based distortion, the application of a discount rate 
could complicate economic comparison between durational regulation and static law. 
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regulation may rely on either the initial lawmakers, or another 
subsidiary body, to engage in the process of reconsidering legal rules. 
Adaptive regulation is “an iterative, incremental decisionmaking 
process built around a continuous process of monitoring the effects of 
decisions and adjusting decisions accordingly.”186 To the challenge of 
uncertainty, adaptive regulation answers: if relevant information 
emerges in the future, procedures will require consideration of that 
information and an appropriate response. 
This model of dynamic law is purely procedural in nature. Scholars 
of adaptive management—the most prevalent form of adaptive 
regulation—even dispute whether adaptive regulation should pursue 
specified goals, or whether the goals of regulation should instead emerge 
and change through the iterative process of defining the contours of the 
legal regime.187 In other words, adaptive regulation does not pursue 
ideal governance at the outset, and lawmakers need not—and should 
not—pre-commit to specific substantive changes to a law in the event of 
either foreseen or unforeseen future occurrences. Rather, the premise of 
adaptive regulation is that accounting for new information is better 
done over time. Adaptive regulation encompasses a range of regulatory 
approaches, including, at one extreme, a grant of broad discretion for 
lawmakers to revisit and modify a legal rule when new information is 
identified, and at the other, a set of highly structured provisions 
governing when and how reconsideration must occur. Adaptive 
regulation, then, attempts to create a system that can improve with 
experience.188 
 
 186 Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management, supra note 128, at 28; see also Notice of 
Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and 
Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242-01, 35,252 (June 1, 2000) (“Adaptive 
management is an integrated method for addressing uncertainty in natural resource 
management. It also refers to a structured process for learning by doing.” (citations omitted)); 
Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11, at 1464 (“[A]ny 
adaptive strategy must include at least two key features: iterative decisionmaking and a 
commitment to learning over time.”). 
 187 Compare Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11, at 
1469 (emphasizing “the need for clear goals set exogenously to the adaptive management 
process”), with NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
FOR WATER RESOURCES PROJECT PLANNING 24 (2004) (listing elements of adaptive 
management as including “[m]anagement objectives that are regularly revisited and 
accordingly revised” by participating stakeholders). 
 188 The Fish and Wildlife Service has identified the following key elements of an adaptive 
management strategy: 
(1) identify the uncertainty and the questions that need to be addressed to resolve the 
uncertainty; (2) develop alternative strategies and determine which experimental 
strategies to implement; (3) integrate a monitoring program that is able to detect the 
necessary information for strategy evaluation; and (4) incorporate feedback loops 
that link implementation and monitoring to a decision-making process (which may 
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Scholars and lawmakers have developed the concept of adaptive 
management—the most mature form of adaptive regulation—out of a 
desire to have legal regimes reflect the chaotic, turbulent perturbations 
that exist in the natural world. 189  J.B. Ruhl has stated this view 
eloquently in his advocacy for adaptive management. Ruhl argues that 
“[t]o manage the impact of human society on the inherently chaotic, 
adaptive environment, the environmental law system itself must possess 
those dynamical qualities.” 190  Just as caterpillars evolve over the 
generations to become resistant to defensive toxins produced by the 
plants they eat,191 adaptive regulation evolves with the generation of new 
information about environmental conditions and effective strategies for 
mitigating the negative effects of human activity. This is often 
accomplished through hefty reliance on public participation based on 
models of new governance.192 Such efforts are intended to enhance 
ecological learning, build trust between stakeholders, better broadcast 
the results of monitoring, and ensure that evolution in management 
occurs.193 These public participation processes, however, while central 
to many proposals for adaptive management, are not necessarily 
inherent in adaptive regulation itself. 
More than other forms of dynamic law, adaptive regulation may be 
designed not only to respond to new information, but also to generate 
that information. As a Department of the Interior report explains, “[a] 
distinguishing feature [of adaptive management] is the use of 
management interventions as experimental treatments, the fundamental 
goal of which is to improve management.”194 This is particularly true for 
 
be similar to a dispute-resolution process) that result in appropriate changes in 
management. 
Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation 
Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35,252; see also J.B. Ruhl, 
General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—With 
Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1391 (2011) [hereinafter 
Ruhl, Resilience and Adaptive Capacity]. 
 189 See Tarlock, supra note 49, at 1128–29. 
 190 Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law, supra note 51, at 940. 
 191 See John Smiley, Plant Chemistry and the Evolution of Host Specificity: New Evidence 
from Heliconius and Passiflora, 201 SCIENCE 745, 745 (1978). 
 192 See, e.g., Maria E. Fernandez-Gimenez et al., Adaptive Management and Social Learning 
in Collaborative and Community-Based Monitoring: A Study of Five Community-Based Forestry 
Organizations in the Western USA, 13 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 2, art. 4, at 9 (2008), 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss2/art4. 
 193 See id. 
 194 BYRON K. WILLIAMS & ELEANOR D. BROWN, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE MGMT. 
WORKING GRP., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
APPLICATIONS GUIDE v (2012), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/ppa/upload/
DOI-Adapative-Management-Applications-Guide.pdf. 
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what is termed “active” adaptive management. 195  Active adaptive 
management treats the project of governance as an experiment, tasking 
lawmakers with developing multiple regulatory treatments for testing to 
be used simultaneously. For example, a state agency attempting to 
reduce nonpoint source water pollution from road construction projects 
might require silt fences along one stream, a vegetative buffer along 
another, and a storm water management system along a third. Over 
time, the agency would assess the efficacy of each management regime 
and use comparative information to formulate new policies. The 
agency’s process would not be crabbed by any front-end limitations. 
The agency could allow each treatment to persist, make modifications to 
the treatment, or abandon it altogether—as deemed appropriate. While 
active adaptive management is, perhaps, ideally suited to developing a 
richer understanding of regulatory interventions, it has rarely been 
implemented in practice because it requires a careful and resource-
consuming process of formulating policy alternatives and implementing 
them in such a way so as to produce useable information.196 Moreover, 
where the consequences of poor management decisions are significant, 
experimentation may lead to undesirable, high-profile failures. 197 
Compare two hypothetical agencies attempting to preserve an 
endangered species. The first implements a single management regime 
that fails, leading to the species’ extinction. The second implements 
three approaches, two of which fail, leading to a two-thirds decline of 
the population. The latter agency may actually be subject to greater 
criticism than the first. The fact that one policy intervention worked 
may suggest to the public that the agency should have known how to 
preserve the species, but decided to experiment with other, inferior 
policies. 
Adaptive regulation is an enticing concept, particularly to those 
with a scientific frame of mind. The scientific method emphasizes 
experimentation to confirm or disprove hypotheses. From existing 
observations and information, the scientist develops a hypothesis. This 
hypothesis is then tested through experimentation and the new 
information that is generated is then used to refine (or even abandon) 
the initial hypothesis, setting the stage for a further round of 
 
 195 See Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11, at 1465–
66; see also Biber, supra note 11, at 938. 
 196 See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 441. 
 197 See  Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat 
Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242-01, 35,252 
(June 1, 2000) (“[A]n active approach may pose too much of a risk to the species . . . [and] may 
also be too cumbersome.”). 
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experimentation.198 In the world of science, developing and refining 
hypotheses may be the intellectually challenging part of the process, but 
experimentation consumes the majority of resources. 
So the scientist wants government to be: Agencies should develop a 
hypothesis about how a regulatory tool will achieve a desired outcome. 
This hypothesis should then be tested in the real world through 
regulatory action; and the agency should refine or abandon the 
hypothesis based on new information, and develop a new or refined 
regulatory approach. The trouble is that, unlike a scientific laboratory, 
the decision by a government agency to adopt a particular hypothesis 
and implement a particular “experiment” is what consumes significant 
time and resources. Making decisions requires significant effort; 
agencies must engage with regulated communities and the broader 
public, must conduct any necessary environmental review, must 
compile a record that supports the decision, must proceed through the 
stages of decision-making that have been established by the 
Administrative Procedure Act, and must eventually deploy the legal 
resources that are necessary to address any legal challenges. In some 
sense, this contrast highlights the difference between despotic 
government and democratic government. The principle investigator in a 
lab has the dictatorial authority to make a specific decision as she deems 
appropriate. However, agencies must proceed in accordance with 
democratic principles. The calculus of legislative bodies is similar. 
Adaptive management has become the dominant model for 
managing natural resources problems. It has become so central to the 
thinking of scholars in the field that it is imported whole cloth into 
other innovations in the field. For example, one definition of ecosystem 
management—which at its core suggests that management of natural 
resources should occur at an ecosystem level because of 
interconnections among natural constituencies—defines it as 
“management driven by explicit goals, executed by policies, protocols, 
and practices, and made adaptable by monitoring and research based on 
our best understanding of the ecological interactions and processes 
necessary to sustain ecosystem composition, structure, and function.”199 
So too does the influential exposition of ecosystem management by R. 
Edward Grumbine, which identifies adaptive management as a core 
 
 198 See Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for Triers 
of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563, 1579 (2000). 
 199 Kalyani Robbins, An Ecosystem Management Primer: History, Perceptions, and Modern 
Definitions, in THE LAWS OF NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF ECOSYSTEM 
MANAGEMENT LAW & POLICY 9 (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2013) (quoting Norman L. Christensen, 
The Report of the Ecological Society of America Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem 
Management, 6 Ecological Applications 665 (1996)). 
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component of ecosystem management.200 Kalyani Robbins similarly 
explains that “[i]n implementing ecosystem management, arguably the 
most core universally expected element is adaptive management.”201 She 
further describes adaptive management as “a completely indispensable 
component” of ecosystem management.202 The definition suffers from 
over-determination. Ecosystem management does not require adaptive 
management. Understandings of ecosystems are uncertain and in flux, 
and policy should account for that. But law can account for uncertainty 
in multiple ways, not just through adaptive management. 
The reflexive turn to adaptive regulation when uncertainty arises, 
particularly in the guise of adaptive management, may be problematic. 
That does not undercut, however, the importance of this policy option 
in certain circumstances. 
2.     Adaptive Regulation Across Context 
As has been explained, adaptive regulation is ubiquitous in natural 
resources law. The Department of Interior, which houses the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Land Management, and National Park 
Service has an adaptive management working group, 203  and each 
component has incorporated adaptive management into site-specific 
management decisions. 204  The U.S. Forest Service similarly views 
adaptive management as a key component of its decision-making 
process,205 and adaptive management has played an important role in 
the management of oceanic fisheries.206 
 
 200 See id. at 10. 
 201 Id. at 12. 
 202 Id. 
 203 See, e.g., GEORGE H. STANKEY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS (2005). 
 204 See, e.g., BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FIRE PLANNING 
HANDBOOK H-9211-1 6-1 (2012), http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/Information_
Resources_Management/policy/blm_handbook.Par.4265.File.dat/FINAL_H-9211-1_
transmittal%20sheet.pdf; BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF 
DECISION & APPROVED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR CLEAR CREEK MANAGEMENT AREA 
22 (2014) [hereinafter BLM, CLEAR CREEK MANAGEMENT AREA], http://www.blm.gov/style/
medialib/blm/ca/pdf/hollister/planning.Par.27928.File.dat/CCMA_ROD_2014_final_with_
cover508.pdf; FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., LEARNING TO MANAGE A COMPLEX 
ECOSYSTEM: ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AND THE NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN (George H. Stankey 
et al. eds., 2006), http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_rp567.pdf; Camacho, supra note 19, at 
302–03; Winter Use Adaptive Management Program, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/
yell/parkmgmt/wuamp.htm (last visited July 22, 2015). 
 205 See FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., LAND MANAGEMENT PLANNING HANDBOOK: 
CHAPTER 40—KEY PROCESSES SUPPORTING LAND MANAGEMENT PLANNING (2013 ), 
http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5409879.pdf. 
 206 See PAC. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., GROUNDFISH 
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In some instances, lawmakers command that adaptive 
management should be used, but then provide little specific guidance as 
to what goals should be pursued, what information should be collected, 
or how that information should affect future decisions. In 2009, 
President Barack Obama issued an Executive Order addressing the 
restoration of the Chesapeake Bay, which required the development of a 
strategy “for coordinated implementation of existing programs and 
projects to guide efforts to protect and restore the Chesapeake Bay” and 
to include “a process for the implementation of adaptive management 
principles, including a periodic evaluation of protection and restoration 
activities.”207 The Order further required the EPA to “identify pollution 
control strategies and actions authorized by the EPA’s existing 
authorities to restore the Chesapeake Bay that . . . are based on sound 
science and reflect adaptive management principles . . . .”208 But the 
Executive Order provides little guidance as to how the EPA is to 
accomplish these tasks. 
Many agencies provide more detailed adaptive management 
programs, identifying triggering events that will initiate the process of 
reconsidering applicable legal rules. For example, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service produced a “conservation strategy” for grizzly bear populations 
to support its 2007 decision to remove certain populations from the 
endangered species list. 209  The delisting decision explains that 
“[r]ecovery of a species is a dynamic process requiring adaptive 
management . . . that may, or may not, fully follow the guidance 
provided in a recovery plan.”210 The strategy specifies that “[t]he best 
way to ensure a healthy population of grizzly bears is to monitor both 
population and habitat parameters closely and respond when necessary 
with adaptive management addressing the problems of the population 
in a dynamic way. That is what this [c]onservation [s]trategy is designed 
to accomplish.”211 The strategy further identifies specific situations in 
which adaptive management would be utilized. The strategy creates a 
taskforce responsible for monitoring the grizzly bear population and 
 
FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN AMENDMENT 20 (TRAWL RATIONALIZATION) E-2 (2010), http://
www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/PCGFFMP_A20_AsApproved.pdf. 
 207 Exec. Order No. 13508, 74 Fed. Reg. 23099, 23100 (May 12, 2009). 
 208 Id. at 23101. 
 209 Removing the Yellowstone Distinct Population Segment of Grizzly Bears from the 
Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed. Reg. 14,866-01 (Mar. 29, 2007) 
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); INTERAGENCY CONSERVATION STRATEGY TEAM, U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR THE GRIZZLY BEAR IN THE GREATER 
YELLOWSTONE AREA 31 (2007) [hereinafter USFWS, GRIZZLY STRATEGY], http://www.fws.gov/
mountain-prairie/species/mammals/grizzly/ConservationStrategygrizzlybearGYA.pdf. 
 210 Removing the Yellowstone Distinct Population Segment of Grizzly Bears from the 
Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed. Reg. at 14,869. 
 211 USFWS, GRIZZLY STRATEGY, supra note 209, at 20 (citation omitted). 
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provides that any member of the taskforce can call for a “Biology and 
Monitoring Review” process that would include “identify[ing] the 
reasons why particular demographic or habitat objectives have not been 
achieved and . . . modify[ing] management as necessary.”212 Despite this 
detailed adaptive management plan, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the 
delisting decision, explaining that “[f]or adaptive management of a 
potential threat to suffice as a basis for a delisting determination, we 
believe that more specific management responses, tied to more specific 
triggering criteria, are required.”213 In the nomenclature that this Article 
proposes, the court essentially rejected the concept of adaptive 
regulation, instead requiring that agencies implement contingent 
regulation.214 
Adaptive management is also included in less headline-grabbing 
decisions. For example, BLM incorporated adaptive management into 
its travel management plan for the Clear Creek Management Area. 
Clear Creek includes a geologic formation which is high in asbestos and 
through which numerous off-road vehicle trails cross.215 BLM’s goals in 
managing vehicle access in the area are to minimize the risks to public 
health that may be caused by traversing this formation and to allow 
ample opportunities for recreation.216 The plan provides the public with 
access to certain routes and establishes that “[i]f any of the following 
‘adaptive management criteria’ are met, BLM would reinitiate travel 
management planning.”217 Those criteria include the emergence of 
research establishing “effective strategies” to reduce exposure to asbestos 
or indicating a “significant reduction in the toxicity values for 
asbestos.”218 
Adaptive regulation has seen little actual use outside the 
environmental and natural resources context, although scholars 
increasingly call for its adoption. Roberta Romano, for example, has 
argued that financial markets present regulators with a dynamic 
environment full of unknowns and that adaptive regulation should be 
deployed to allow laws to respond to market feedback. 219  The 
importance of implementing such an approach arises from the 
externalities imposed by regulations that are poorly calibrated to 
 
 212 Id. at 10. 
 213 Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 214 See id. 
 215 See BLM, CLEAR CREEK MANAGEMENT AREA, supra note 204, at 1-1. 
 216 Id. at 21. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. at 22. 
 219 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 68, at 103; see also, e.g., Charles K. Whitehead, The 
Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and Staged Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1295 
(2012). 
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address financial markets—regulations which are often created in a 
moment of crisis against a backdrop of incomplete information.220 
Rosie Cooney and Andrew Lang have similarly proposed 
incorporating adaptive regulation into international governance 
regimes.221 International trade agreements, for example, often involve 
complex interdependencies between states that are incompletely 
understood, and such agreements therefore have unpredictable and 
sometimes negative outcomes.222 By focusing on continuous learning, 
governance structures could better reflect the dynamic nature of 
international social systems.223 Cooney and Lang specifically argue that 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) should incorporate adaptive 
regulation because that entity faces significant uncertainty about the 
effects of its decisions on natural, social, and economic systems.224 
Adaptive regulation could enable the WTO to avoid acting prematurely, 
and could instead enable it to proceed experimentally in order to 
improve the effectiveness of its interventions.225 
3.     Benefits and Burdens of Adaptive Regulation 
Adaptive regulation has proven to be an intoxicating approach to 
lawmaking and scholars and has become a mainstay of environmental 
and natural resources policymaking, although even its strongest 
advocates recognize that it may not be suited for all regulatory 
contexts.226 It has three significant benefits. 
First, adaptive regulation allows lawmakers to adjust their 
decisions based on new information and new conditions without 
predetermining the most appropriate regulatory response. By declining 
to commit to policy responses in advance, adaptive regulation avoids the 
inertia created by front-end decisions. 227  Once government has 
announced a particular course for regulation, changing that course can 
be difficult because regulated entities organize their affairs around the 
announced course. Because adaptive regulation is intentionally and 
transparently open-ended, it reduces the expectation of regulatory 
 
 220 See Romano, supra note 68, at 88. 
 221 Cooney & Lang, supra note 13, at 524. 
 222 Id. at 532–33. 
 223 Id. at 534. 
 224 Id. at 536, 547–48. 
 225 Id. 
 226 See, e.g., Craig & Ruhl, supra note 11, at 12–13. 
 227 While the use durational regulation reflects the appeal of ongoing change in a similar 
fashion to the appeal of adaptive regulation, it does so less self-consciously and creates a risk 
that the initial legal regime may become institutionalized and therefore difficult to change. 
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certainty. This is particularly true for active adaptive management, 
whereby agencies deploy multiple regulatory interventions 
simultaneously.228 In such circumstances, no one rule will become 
entrenched because several are implemented simultaneously. 
The flexibility of adaptive regulation, at least in theory, is difficult 
to overstate. Adaptive regulation tries to replace guesswork at the front 
end of a regulatory regime with knowledge as the regime unfolds. No 
matter the sophistication or expertise of lawmakers, unforeseen events 
will occur, and adaptive regulation is designed with that in mind. 
Adaptive regulation recognizes the impossibility of achieving socially 
optimal rules, and it emphasizes the search for improvement as a 
replacement for efforts to achieve perfection. 
Second, adaptive regulation spreads the cost of decision-making 
over time by reducing up-front costs, particularly when compared to 
contingent regulation and its requirement that lawmakers identify and 
plan for all foreseeable contingencies before making an initial 
decision.229 Where uncertainty is at its apex, this may be a particularly 
effective strategy. Lawmakers may have little ability to predict which 
circumstances may emerge in the future, and the effort to do so may 
prove costly and ineffective. Adaptive regulation requires no such 
planning because it allows rules to change as new information arises. 
Third, adaptive regulation may be better suited to producing 
information than other approaches to uncertainty. Difficult governance 
problems require investigation and experimentation. Many social 
problems appear intractable, and an evolutionary approach to 
governance offers the promise of transformation and consensus. This 
approach is of particular appeal where the risk of catastrophic or 
irreversible consequences is low. For example, the Forest Service 
manages seventy-nine experimental forests on federal land with the 
clear purpose and design of improving the government’s understanding 
of the effectiveness of forestry practices.230 The long-term effects of 
experimenting within those forests are low, particularly because they 
account for only a quarter of one percent of all national forest lands.231 
 
 228 See supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text. 
 229 The monitoring required for effective adaptive regulation may carry substantial costs. See 
Biber, supra note 11, at 945–48. Effective monitoring is, however, required for all forms of 
dynamic law. 
 230 See, e.g., FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EXPERIMENTAL FORESTS AND RANGES OF 
THE USDA FOREST SERVICE (Mary Beth Adams et al. eds., 2008), http://www.nrs.fs.fed.us/pubs/
gtr/gtr_ne321R.pdf?. Experimental forests and ranges are used for scientific research of all 
types, not only research into forest management. See id. 
 231 Compare Ariel E. Lugo et al., Long-Term Research at the USDA Forest Service’s 
Experimental Forests and Ranges, 56 BIOSCIENCE 39, 41 (2006) (stating that USDA experimental 
forests and ranges encompass 196,300 hectares), with FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
NATURAL RESOURCE BASED TOURISM 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacj363.pdf (stating 
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Adaptive management has become widely embraced because it is 
difficult to dispute its premises. 232  The modern eye recognizes 
complexity and uncertainty everywhere. We fear to commit to any 
particular policy for fear of being wrong. Adaptive management has a 
palliative effect by allowing us to postpone hard decisions until a future 
time. Why choose today when we will know more tomorrow? 
While the effectiveness of current instantiations of adaptive 
regulation have come under fire in recent years, few environmental law 
scholars dispute that uncertainty about the environment requires open-
ended evolutionary processes of adaptive regulation. Adaptive 
regulation might be too costly,233 difficult to reconcile with existing 
administrative law234 or statutes,235 unlikely to survive judicial review,236 
or too easily manipulated for political gain.237 But most scholars agree 
that it is “far more suited to the needs of future regulatory challenges 
than is prescriptive regulation.” 238  These concerns, however, are 
substantial and worthy of consideration. In many circumstances, other 
forms of dynamic law may address uncertainty while avoiding these 
problems. 
A central problem of adaptive regulation is that it only provides for 
process, and due to resource constraints, a lack of political will, or 
continuing uncertainty, the promise of adaptation is too often 
unfulfilled. Adaptive regulation “can make it easier for agencies to yield 
to the temptation to dodge difficult, controversial decisions,” and to 
 
that USDA manages 77 million hectares). Policy experimentation faces significantly higher 
risks in other contexts. For example, the federal government manages the Columbia River for 
the purposes of conserving thirteen threatened and endangered fish stocks and producing a 
considerable portion of the Northwest’s electricity. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., 
REINVESTING IN ASSETS 4 (2013), http://www.bpa.gov/news/pubs/FactSheets/fs-201307-
Reinvesting%20in%20assets.pdf.; Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role of the Judge in 
ESA Implementation: District Judge James Redden and the Columbia Basin Salmon Saga, 32 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 99 (2013). 
 232 For example, J.B. Ruhl recently outlined principles for the development of laws that can 
exhibit resilience and adaptive capacity in the face of climate change. Ruhl, Resilience and 
Adaptive Capacity, supra note 188, at 1382. His model emphasizes the development of law that 
contains internal mechanisms to develop in new directions based on emerging information, 
relying heavily on theories of adaptive management. See id. at 1391. It is certainly true that 
climate change has the potential to place unforeseeable strain on society and the legal structure. 
Emphasizing open-ended evolution, however, overlooks the many consequences of climate 
change that are foreseeable and that can enable government to put substantive responses in 
place to those consequences, rather than to simply wait until they manifest. 
 233 See Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11. 
 234 See Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management, supra note 128. 
 235 See Julie Thrower, Note, Adaptive Management and NEPA: How a Nonequilibrium View 
of Ecosystems Mandates Flexible Regulation, 33 ECOLOLGY L.Q. 871, 879 (2006). 
 236 See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 447. 
 237 See Doremus, “New Age” Environmental Protection, supra note 21, at 55–56. 
 238 Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management, supra note 128, at 29. 
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address challenging problems by offering vague promises for future 
action.239 Ensuring public accountability can also prove challenging 
because adaptive regulation processes are often opaque to outside 
observers.240 
The challenges that come with adaptive regulation may be 
responsible for its mixed track record in practice. The promise of 
flexible regulation has often devolved into endless iterative decision-
making processes that have lost sight of the relevant fundamental goals. 
One example is the decades-long adaptive management of the Columbia 
River, which sought to balance the needs of endangered salmon with 
agricultural and electric utility interests.241 Regulators have relied on 
adaptive management to consistently side-step difficult political issues, 
and this indefinite regulatory limbo has resulted in the Oregon District 
Court vacating numerous plans for operating the system.242 
Adaptive regulation also may not provide the information that is 
needed to recalibrate a regulatory regime. Holly Doremus has argued 
that adaptive regulation only makes sense when experimentation with 
management options can reasonably be expected to fill the information 
gaps that regulators face. 243  Where experimentation is unlikely to 
produce useful information—because, for example, the number of 
variables are too high or the timescale to assess the success of any option 
is too great—adaptive regulation will not produce improved 
governance, but rather will constitute an empty formality.244 
Adaptive regulation also faces legal problems because its 
fundamental premise—open-ended discretion and flexibility—conflicts 
with the broader framework of administrative law. The procedural 
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, the National 
Environmental Policy Act, and the Endangered Species Act, among 
others, make it difficult for agencies to quickly modify their decisions to 
 
 239 Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 459–60. 
 240 See Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11, at 1463 
(“Uncertainty therefore makes it difficult for the public to discern whether managers are doing 
their best to follow legislative direction or instead bowing to political pressure.”). 
 241 See, e.g., Schultz & Nie, supra note 22, at 470–73; John M. Volkman, How Do You Learn 
from a River? Managing Uncertainty in Species Conservation Policy, 74 WASH. L. REV. 719, 740–
62 (1999). 
 242 See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Or. 
2011); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Or. 2003); 
Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Or. 1994), 
vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 243 Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11, at 1467. 
Doremus specifies three necessary conditions for adaptive management: “First, there must be 
an information gap that is important to management choices. Second, it must seem possible to 
fill that gap on a management-relevant time scale. Third, it must seem possible to adjust the 
initial decision over time in response to new information.” Id. 
 244 Id. at 1467–68. 
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incorporate new information.245 Moreover, courts have generally found 
that a general commitment to adaptively manage is an insufficiently 
precise explanation for an agency’s approach to meeting its statutory 
obligations.246 These constraints are not inherent problems of adaptive 
regulation, but rather make effective adaptive regulation difficult to 
achieve. 
Relatedly, adaptive management may offer agencies a means of 
increasing their discretion at the expense of democratic constraints. In 
its 2004 planning regulations, the U.S. Forest Service proposed a 
“paradigm shift in land management planning” and embraced a more 
adaptive approach to managing forestlands 247 —an emphasis that 
persisted in the 2008 and 2015 planning rules.248 Critics have argued 
that, in reality, this move toward adaptation constitutes “a means to 
remove standards, undermine [the National Environmental Policy Act] 
and [the National Forest Management Act], and maximize agency 
discretion.”249 
Managing public resources to enhance learning also poses 
normative problems. Federal land managers have an obligation to 
manage public resources for the benefit of the public. Producing 
knowledge is important and worthwhile, but such production should 
not become an end goal. Just as a financial manager should make 
investments geared toward enhancing a client’s wealth, so too should 
governmental entities act to preserve and enhance the quality of public 
resources for the benefit of the public. The importance of achieving 
resource protection is sometimes overlooked by advocates of adaptive 
regulation, who occasionally act more like scientists than policy experts. 
For example, Kai Lee lamented Australia’s decision to ban timber 
harvesting in the rainforests of Queensland. Prior to the ban, timber 
managers experimented with models for sustainable yields. “Without an 
experimental program of management at the ecosystem scale, . . . we can 
be certain that some important questions will remain unanswered.”250 
Lee is certainly correct that banning logging caused government 
managers to lose the opportunity to learn more about the effects of 
 
 245 See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 426; see also Craig & Ruhl, supra note 11. 
 246 See, e.g., Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 247 National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023-01, 1024 (Jan. 5, 
2005) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219). 
 248 See National Forest System, Land Management Planning Directives, 80 Fed. Reg. 6683-
01, 6684 (Feb. 6, 2015); National Forest System Land Management Planning, 73 Fed. Reg. 
21,468-01, 21,468 (Apr. 21, 2008) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219). 
 249 Martin Nie, Whatever Happened to Ecosystem Management and Federal Lands Planning?, 
in THE LAWS OF NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 
LAW & POLICY 67, 68, 77 (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2013). 
 250 LEE, supra note 46, at 112.  
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timber harvesting. If logging can no longer occur, however, that 
knowledge is of questionable value from the perspective of managing 
public resources. Adaptive regulation, then, may threaten to substitute 
the goals of scientific inquiry for the goals of governance. 
Finally, adaptive management may prove rudderless in at least 
some of its manifestations. Adaptive regulation could be used both to 
tailor regulation to new information and to determine the very goals of 
management. In other words, “knowledge gained by experiment would 
improve either the goals pursued or the means by which they are 
achieved.”251 If the goals of governance are up for grabs in an adaptive 
management process, this renders the project of governance inherently 
unstable.252 Where a policy’s meta-goal includes the modification of its 
first order priorities, it risks proceeding without a compass. 
C.     Contingent Regulation 
Unlike durational regulation and adaptive regulation, contingent 
regulation incorporates mechanisms that automatically adjust the 
substantive content of legal rules when foreseeable events occur or new 
information emerges. To an extent, contingent regulation resembles 
static law in that it involves no ongoing process for reconsidering legal 
rules. Yet, contingent regulation remains responsive. 
1.     The Structure of Contingent Regulation 
Contingent regulation resembles the type of contingency planning 
consistently practiced by individuals, families, and businesses. It is a 
branching legal framework that creates an initial legal rule, identifies 
foreseeable events that might undermine the efficacy of that rule, and 
creates a plan as to how that legal rule should change in response. In a 
sense, contingent regulation is static because choices are all made at the 
outset when a law is first created. Yet it is also dynamic because the 
operative legal rule changes alongside changing circumstances. To the 
challenge of uncertainty, contingent regulation answers: if relevant 
information emerges in the future, the legal rule will automatically 
change in a predetermined fashion. 
Like durational and adaptive regulation, contingent regulation 
enables law to keep pace with real-world circumstances. If adaptive 
 
 251 Id. at 129. 
 252 Cf. Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11, at 1469 
(identifying “the need for clear goals set exogenously to the adaptive management process”). 
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regulation is the regulatory analog of evolution, contingent regulation is 
analogous to the somewhat more obscure biological concept of 
“plasticity.” Plasticity refers to the ability of organisms to respond to 
changes in the environment based on existing genetic traits.253 For 
example, some caterpillars exhibit different coloration and shape 
depending on their food source. If the caterpillar eats oak flowers, for 
example, it grows to camouflage itself as an oak catkin. If it eats leaves, it 
grows to camouflage itself as a twig.254 The caterpillar has the genetic 
potential to assume either shape, and the environment it happens to 
encounter determines its form. Contingent regulation proceeds 
similarly. Lawmakers put in place a regulatory structure that functions 
as the DNA of the law. That DNA encodes built-in responses to 
identified contingencies. 
Contingent regulation is, then, an ex ante approach to uncertainty. 
In formulating contingent regulation, lawmakers must identify and map 
possible circumstances that will arise after a legal rule is promulgated. 
For each foreseeable condition, a decision must be made as to if and 
how the legal rule should change in response. Naturally, it is 
unavoidable that a framework built on contingent regulation will 
envision many eventualities that will never come to pass. 
2.     Contingent Regulation Across Contexts 
While contingent regulation has not previously been named, it has 
been deployed in both legislation and regulation. At times this has 
occurred under the moniker of adaptive management, despite the 
differences inherent in the two approaches. 
The Fish and Wildlife Service’s handbook governing Habitat 
Conservation Plans (HCPs) is one of the few sources that treat 
contingent regulation as distinct from adaptive management.255 The 
Endangered Species Act requires an HCP for any party seeking an 
incidental take permit to authorize an activity that may incidentally 
harm a threatened or endangered species.256 Such harm is otherwise 
 
 253 See Cynthia Weinig et al., Testing Adaptive Plasticity to UV: Costs and Benefits of Stem 
Elongation and Light-Induced Phenolics, 58 EVOLUTION 2645, 2645 (2004); John L. Maron et al., 
Rapid Evolution of an Invasive Plant, 74 ECOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 261, 261–62 (2004). 
 254 See Douglas W. Whitman & Anurag A. Agrawal, What is Phenotypic Plasticity and why is 
it Important?, in PHENOTYPIC PLASTICITY OF INSECTS: MECHANISMS AND CONSEQUENCES 2 
(Douglas W. Whitman & T.N. Ananthakrishnan eds., 2009). 
 255 See FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ADDENDUM TO THE HCP 
HANDBOOK 5 (2000) [hereinafter USFWS, HCP ADDENDUM], http://www.fws.gov/midwest/
endangered/permits/hcp/pdf/HCPAddendum.pdf. 
 256 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (2012). 
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prohibited.257 An HCP must, “to the maximum extent practicable, 
minimize and mitigate the impacts” of the activity on the protected 
species.258 The handbook governing the development of HCPs requires 
“contingency planning” to “incorporate measures to be implemented” 
in the event that “circumstances that can be reasonably anticipated” 
occur.259 The handbook treats contingency planning as distinct from 
adaptive regulation, explaining that it “lays a foundation for 
contingency planning in HCPs that may or may not include adaptive 
management.”260 Elsewhere, however, the Fish and Wildlife Service has 
treated contingency planning as a variety of adaptive management.261 
The City of Seattle’s HCP, which covers the Cedar River watershed, 
is a good example of contingent regulation. 262 The City uses the 
watershed as its water supply and its activities in the watershed impact 
fourteen protected species, including six birds, six fish, and two 
mammals.263 The plan establishes extensive conservation efforts for 
these species and includes 
a commitment to an adaptive approach with two variations: (1) 
contingent responses for changed circumstances related to 
environmental events, and a formal approach with predefined 
criteria and decision thresholds for specific activities where 
considerable uncertainty exists; and (2) a second, less formal and 
more flexible approach that will be used as a simple tool or 
mechanism for responding to new information and experience that 
can be used to make conservation, management, and mitigation 
strategies more effective.264 
The first approach constitutes contingent regulation: it provides 
specific triggers and specific responses to emerging conditions. The 
 
 257 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2012). 
 258 § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
 259 USFWS, HCP ADDENDUM, supra note 255, at 5–6; see also J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by 
Adaptive Management, supra note 128, at 49 (explaining that the “No Surprises rule” includes 
requirements to “specify the kinds of events and responses for which adjustments will be 
made”). 
 260 USFWS, HCP ADDENDUM, supra note255, at 5. 
 261 See Marj Nelson, The Changing Face of HCPs, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/bulletins/bulletin-summer2000.html (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2015). 
 262 See generally SEATTLE PUB. UTILS., CITY OF SEATTLE, FINAL CEDAR RIVER WATERSHED 
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN (2000) [hereinafter SEATTLE HCP], http://www.seattle.gov/util/
EnvironmentConservation/OurWatersheds/Habitat_Conservation_Plan/AbouttheHCP/
Documents/index.htm. 
 263 Id. at 3.4-3. Not all of these species are threatened or endangered. HCPs may, however, 
include plans for species that may be afforded protection under the ESA at a later time. See U.S. 
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES 
ACT 1 (2011), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/hcp.pdf. 
 264 SEATTLE HCP, supra note 262, at 4.5-3. 
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second approach constitutes open-ended and largely unspecified 
adaptive regulation. 
The contingent regulation aspects of the plan further identify 
management responses in the event of “forest fires,” “windstorms,” 
“disease outbreaks and insect infestations,” “landslides,” and 
“drought.”265 These prescriptions are detailed and specific. If a forest fire 
“remove[s] forest cover on at least 300 acres but less than 2,000 acres in 
any major subbasin,” then the City will take management action, 
including “[m]easures to reduce erosion and sedimentation, including 
stabilization of slopes and soils by such steps as reseeding, reforestation, 
and log terracing.”266 
BLM’s 2008 plan for managing natural gas activities in the Pinedale 
Anticline also incorporates contingent regulation.267 The plan includes a 
“Wildlife Monitoring and Mitigation Matrix,”268 which identifies species 
of concern and various criteria that BLM will monitor. If, for example, a 
“30% change in total number of active” locations for greater sage grouse 
mating rituals occur, then mitigation is required, 269  including 
“[p]rotection of flank areas from disturbance (e.g., voluntary lease 
suspensions, lease buyouts, voluntary limits on area of 
delineation/development drilling) to assure continued habitat function 
of flank areas, and to provide areas for enhancement of habitat 
function.”270 
Reliance on contingency, rather than adaptation, has caused 
consternation for some scholars. For example, J.B. Ruhl and Robert 
Fischman discuss contingency planning as a form of adaptive 
management, referring to the contingency provisions of HCPs as “‘a/m-
lite,’ a watered-down version of [adaptive management] theory that 
resembles ad hoc contingency planning more than it does planned 
‘learning while doing.’”271 Contingent regulation is not, however, a 
variety of adaptive management, but rather its own approach to 
governance. 
 
 265 Id. at 4.5-67–76. 
 266 Id. at 4.5-69. 
 267 See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
 268 BLM ROD, supra note 53, at app. B-1. 
 269 BLM 2008 SEIS APPENDIX, supra note 18, at 10-3. 
 270 Id. at 10-5. “Flank areas” are on the periphery of the Pinedale Anticline and not the 
primary focus of gas development under BLM’s current plan. See BLM ROD, supra note 53, at 
8. 
 271 Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 426 (footnote omitted); see also Ruhl, Regulation by 
Adaptive Management, supra note 128, at 49 (discussing contingencies in HCPs). In his 
detailed review of the HCP program, Alejandro Camacho descriptively distinguishes between 
contingency planning and adaptive management while arguing that “the Services have failed to 
adaptively manage the regulatory process.” See Camacho, supra note 19, at 357. Camacho does 
not analyze the differences between these forms of dynamic regulation. 
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3.     Benefits and Burdens of Contingent Regulation 
Contingent regulation offers advantages unrealized by other forms 
of dynamic law. This Section describes those advantages in more detail 
than that provided for adaptive regulation and durational regulation 
because contingent regulation has received so little attention. 
Understanding contingent regulation as a unique policy approach, 
rather than as a failure of adaptive regulation, reveals its worth. True 
adaptive regulation, with its open-ended and difficult-to-cabin 
commitment to “learning while doing” may be a necessary but costly 
approach to certain problems where uncertainty permeates the 
regulatory context. Contingent regulation, however, provides an 
essential tool to allow government to implement future-oriented actions 
without taking on the panoply of burdens imposed by adaptive 
regulation. 
All forms of dynamic law enable legal rules to respond to new 
information and all generate information that may, in turn, improve 
those legal rules. Contingent regulation requires additional study of 
regulatory problems at the outset, thereby increasing the information 
available to regulators before they make a decision. Such information is 
generated for two reasons. In creating contingent regulation, lawmakers 
must fully specify and study the regulatory task at hand, and they must 
identify with precision the uncertainties faced as well as the extent to 
which future circumstances can be predicted.272 
Contingent regulation also creates incentives for regulated parties 
to share information, thereby increasing the information available to 
lawmakers.273 The information-forcing role of contingencies is well 
understood in the private party context. Parties in a contract negotiation 
have incentives to downplay their assessment of the likelihood of future 
events that will devalue the consideration they offer, but contingencies 
 
 272 Generating information about the future may also have the salutary effect of improving 
the initial regulatory regime. For example, Lynn Blais and Wendy Wanger have argued that 
when making rules, agencies “would evaluate . . . the degree to which technological innovation 
is likely to advance in the relevant field in the future” and would incorporate such information 
into established standards. Blais & Wagner, supra note 174, at 1731 (2008). Engaging in the 
process of developing contingent regulation will compel such consideration. Id. at 1732. 
 273 As Lynn E. Blais and Wendy E. Wagner have explained, regulatory efforts designed to 
address problems that have not galvanized the public face significant obstacles because 
“interested parties—most likely regulated groups—will have a great deal of information at their 
fingertips and both the incentives and the resources to use the courts and any other 
mechanisms at their disposal . . . to delay . . . rulemaking or rule revision.” Blais & Wagner, 
supra note 174, at 1712. Contingent regulation does not fully correct this problem because 
regulated industries may be able to stave off regulatory efforts before they have begun. Where a 
lawmaker begins construction of a legal regime to address a problem, however, contingent 
regulation can facilitate information disclosure, which in turn can facilitate public engagement. 
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can force disclosure. Imagine the following contract negotiation 
between an oil company and an industrial customer for a requirements 
contract for a supply of oil. The oil company suggests that the price of 
oil will increase during the coming year and, therefore, asks for a price 
above current market. The industrial customer has less information 
about the future price of oil and bargains at a disadvantage. The 
customer can, however, resolve this informational asymmetry by 
offering to accept a price that exceeds the current market, but on the 
condition that if oil prices fall, the contract price will be substantially 
reduced. The contingency will force the oil company to disclose the 
information it holds. If the oil company has reasonable confidence that 
oil prices will rise, it will accept the bargain. If, on the other hand, the oil 
company has little confidence in its prediction, or possesses information 
that prices will fall, then it will not. 
Contingent regulation acts similarly. Regulated parties generally 
have an incentive to conceal information about the potential harm 
caused by their activities. Creating contingencies can erode this 
incentive because the advocacy efforts of regulated parties will reveal 
their knowledge: they will resist rules attached to contingencies that they 
expect to occur and will remain indifferent to those attached to 
contingencies that they expect will not occur. In a hypothetical example, 
a zoning board considers a measure to restrict development within an 
area likely to be subject to flooding in the event of a one-foot rise in sea 
level. One board member opposes restricting development because, she 
explains, it will unnecessarily inhibit economic growth because sea 
levels are not rising. A second board member favors restricting 
development because of an expected rise in sea level. Contingent 
regulation tests the convictions of both parties by creating a regime that 
includes relaxed restrictions if sea levels remains constant, but creates 
rigid restrictions if sea levels rise. If both board members have 
confidence in their negotiating positions, they should accept this 
compromise. If one or the other does not sincerely adhere to her 
negotiating position, then she will resist the compromise, thereby 
disclosing information about her true assessment of the situation, which 
in turn will facilitate a more finely tuned negotiation. 
Similarly, business interests that seek to avoid perceived 
burdensome regulations of carbon emissions may express objections in 
the form of denying the existence of climate change. The process of 
developing contingent regulation can unmask such pretextual 
disagreement. This will be true generally. Regulated parties often oppose 
regulation by contesting causation rather than by challenging the goals 
of environmental protection. As Kai Lee explains, “conflict over means 
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becomes a way of disputing goals.”274 Contingent regulation can peel 
back such dishonest opposition. 
A related advantage is that where disagreements involve differing 
beliefs, contingent regulation facilitates compromise. That is because 
contingent regulation can accommodate competing predictions about 
the future by creating regulatory rules to govern each possibility. 
Contingent regulation also more easily accommodates existing 
norms of administrative law than adaptive regulation does. Ruhl and 
Fischman have explored the tension between administrative law and 
adaptive regulation, finding that the United States government has lost 
more than half of the cases in which plaintiffs challenged decisions to 
implement adaptive regulation.275 Administrative law requires federal 
agencies to fully explain their decisions at the outset,276 favoring a front-
loaded decision process that culminates in a single record of decision 
that allows for judicial review. Environmental review obligations 
imposed by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) further 
complicate adaptive regulation because “a promise to adaptively manage 
problems may not fulfill the NEPA requirement that agencies take a 
‘hard look’ at the impacts of their action.”277 Adaptive regulation fits 
with these requirements poorly because it relies on evolutionary 
decisions that do not manifest at a single moment. Contingent 
regulation, on the other hand, fits comfortably within the existing 
framework. Contingent regulation requires lawmakers to address 
foreseeable circumstances and to identify specific government 
responses. Agencies will have to adequately justify these substantive 
decisions, and fully analyze their environmental consequences. That 
process lends itself to existing modes of judicial review. This is not a 
theoretical advantage of contingent regulation, but rather a practical 
advantage that suggests that contingent regulation may be more 
successful than adaptive regulation in light of the existing architecture 
of administrative law. 
Contingent regulation also minimizes delays in responding to new 
information. Government decision-making takes time and consumes 
resources. Where changing conditions require new legal rules, all other 
forms of governance require lawmakers to intervene. Because 
lawmaking processes inherently favor the status quo, parties that benefit 
 
 274 LEE, supra note 46, at 107.  
 275 See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 445. 
 276 See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971), 
abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
 277 Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 460; see also High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Weingardt, 
521 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (vacating an agency decision to liberalize a campfire 
policy that included an adaptive management plan to address potential problems). 
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from the existing regime will have incentives to delay or derail reform. 
Contingent regulation allows for a prompt and nimble response to 
changing circumstances because the new legal rule has already been 
selected. Modification becomes a ministerial act, rather than requiring 
renewed deliberation. 
Finally, contingent regulation may enable lawmakers to avoid 
public choice pitfalls. Public choice theory posits that a relatively small 
number of parties affected strongly by government action will have 
greater influence on government decision-making than a larger group of 
parties that experience smaller affects. 278  While scholars may 
overestimate the effects of such interest-group politics, 279 it has been 
well documented in at least some instances.280 
Processes to adopt static law also may be particularly susceptible to 
public choice problems because those parties subject to government 
restrictions seeking to provide diffuse public goods have significant 
incentive to lobby for loose standards. When the government adopts 
regulations to govern conduct, private interests will often be easy to 
ascertain. And because static law imposes certain and precise 
limitations, these rules will be highly salient to affected parties. Duration 
and adaptive regulation may reduce public choice at the time of the 
initial decision because possible future changes in legal rules will be 
unclear. However, later reevaluations will likely crystallize the effect that 
new management regimes will have. Because contingent regulation 
establishes regulatory rules that will come into effect in the future, but 
only if certain events transpire, these decisions should be less salient to 
private interests, thereby reducing incentives for lobbying. Indeed, it 
may be unpredictable when initial rules are established which parties 
will be most affected by future restrictions because the timing of those 
restrictions is unclear. Moreover, if different contingencies benefit 
different parties, then everyone may support a contingent regulation 
approach when first promulgated in hopes that the contingency that 
benefits them will go into effect. 
Contingent regulation is not a panacea. Unlike durational and 
adaptive regulations, contingent regulation frontloads governmental 
 
 278 Public choice theory posits “that a small number of people or corporations with similar 
interests and a relatively large stake in regulatory outcomes will enjoy comparative success 
organizing into effective lobbying groups.” Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory 
Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1643 (2011). 
 279 Public choice theory does not exhaustively explain decisions of administrative agencies. 
Dave Owen has argued, for example, that in addition to responding to political constituencies, 
“meaningful regulatory effort comes from within the agencies.” See Dave Owen, Critical 
Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 64 FLA. L. REV. 141, 188 (2012). 
 280 See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. 
L. REV. 1029, 1034–37 (2011) (book review). 
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costs. It forces lawmakers to consider foreseeable future circumstances 
and decide how law should respond, even if those circumstances may 
not manifest. Forecasting potential future circumstance may be 
expensive both in terms of money and time, particularly if foreseen 
circumstances will require nuanced responses. 
The efficacy of contingent regulation will also be cabined by the 
ability of lawmakers to predict and plan. Moreover, contingent 
regulation cannot take account of unforeseen future events. Because it 
may require substantial government investment to develop a regulatory 
superstructure capable of responding to foreseen circumstances, that 
regime may prove particularly sticky should unforeseen circumstances 
occur. Such stickiness may result from the “sunk cost” fallacy, a 
cognitive error that causes people to increasingly resist changing course 
as historic costs increase.281 In other words, if contingent regulation fails 
to identify future circumstances, amendment or repeal may be 
particularly difficult to accomplish. 
Contingent regulation is also less flexible than either durational 
regulation or adaptive regulation. As Bradley Karkkainen has argued in 
his critique of contingency planning, “it does not have the open texture, 
flexibility, unboundedness, and openness to surprise and unanticipated 
changes contemplated by advocates of adaptive management.” 282 
Contingent regulation creates a specific set of regulatory responses to a 
specific set of conditions. It cannot respond to conditions other than 
those envisioned at the outset, and it will not optimally respond if new 
information reveals problems with pre-selected regulatory responses. 
These are substantial shortcomings, although each model of 
governance has its weakness. The next Part will suggest criteria for 
selecting models of governance to address specific problems. 
IV.     GOVERNANCE TOOL SELECTION 
As Parts II and III have explained, lawmakers have multiple 
strategies at their disposal to address uncertainty when enacting law. 
Consider again the state highway department concerned about fatalities 
on a particular stretch of highway, and suppose that the highway has an 
existing speed limit of sixty-five miles per hour. Imagine the department 
has set a goal of reducing accidents by twenty-five percent. The 
 
 281 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1482–83 (1998); see also Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-In Effect of Preliminary Injunctions, 66 
FLA. L. REV. 779, 784–85 (2014) (arguing that sunk costs may distort judges’ decisions on the 
merits following the issuance of a preliminary injunction). 
 282 Karkkainen, supra note 22, at 72. 
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department could take four approaches. First, the department could rely 
on static law. It would look at available information, which, say, 
indicates that a fifty-five miles per hour speed limit will achieve the 
desired results, and then impose that speed limit. Second, the 
department could rely on durational regulation by imposing a fifty-five 
miles per hour speed limit set to automatically expire after two years. 
Third, the department could use adaptive regulation. It could set the 
speed limit at fifty-five miles per hour and put in place a process by 
which the driving conditions on the road will be revisited if new 
information emerges. If and when such information emerges, the 
department would consider that information and make any necessary 
adjustments. Perhaps monitoring the road indicates that a particularly 
sharp curve contributes to accidents, and in response to that 
information, the road could be realigned to eliminate the danger. 
Fourth, the department could rely on contingent regulation. The 
department could set the speed limit at fifty-five miles per hour and 
specify that if, after two years, safety has improved by less than the 
twenty-five percent goal, the speed limit will automatically reduce by 
five miles per hour. If, on the other hand, safety improves by more than 
twenty-five percent, the speed limit could automatically rise by five 
miles per hour. 
How should a lawmaker select an approach in a specific 
circumstance? When is stability more important than dynamism? And if 
dynamism better addresses a particular problem or a particular set of 
circumstances, what form should that dynamism take? 
This Part turns to those questions. As it reveals, optimal tool 
selection takes account of a number of factors, including the costs 
associated with dynamic law, the variety of uncertainty involved, and 
the resources a lawmaker possesses to revisit past decisions. As Figure 2 
suggests, particular models of governance will often be suited to a 
particular constellation of those variables. Where dynamism imposes a 
high cost relative to the benefits likely to flow from more responsive 
governance, static law should be chosen. Where the benefits exceed 
costs, a dynamic solution is more appropriate. In such circumstances, 
contingent regulation is most appropriate where the lawmaker has 
reasonable confidence that it can predict likely future circumstances. If 
not, durational regulation is appropriate where the lawmaker is resource 
rich. If the lawmaker faces the likelihood of unforeseen future 
circumstances and is resource poor, it should select adaptive regulation. 
These variables—the benefits and costs of dynamism, the type of 
uncertainty involved, and the resource richness of the lawmaker—
provide a diagnostic framework to aid lawmakers in deciding what form 
of governance is best suited to a particular problem. Each variable is 
discussed in greater detail in the remainder of this Part. 
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A.     Costs and Benefits of Dynamism 
The first variable lawmakers need to consider when selecting a tool 
to govern in the face of uncertainty is the expected costs and benefits 
associated with making a legal regime respond dynamically to new 
information. Where the cost of dynamism outweighs likely benefits, 
static law is the most appropriate tool. Where dynamism will result in 
net social benefit, a form of dynamic law is appropriate. 
Understanding the benefits side of this equation involves assessing 
the goals of lawmaking and the severity of errors. Dynamic law provides 
few benefits for certain lawmaking goals, particularly where a legal rule 
is designed to instantiate a particular moral viewpoint, such as the 
Convention Against Torture’s prohibition on torture, 283  or a 
punishment practice pursuing retributive ends. Such legal rules are 
communicative acts and do not primarily aim at attaining particular 
results. Dynamic law has little to offer. When, however, a legal regime 
 
 283 See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
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aims at real-world effects, such as protecting public health, deterring 
illegal entry into the country, or ensuring the survival of an endangered 
species, creating a legal regime that can account for new information 
yields benefits. 
Such benefits may, however, be slight. Sometimes getting a legal 
regime exactly right matters a great deal, other times it matters less. 
When states adopted the right side driving rule, uncertainty existed as to 
the consequences of that decision, but the likely severity of those 
consequences was low. The right side driving rule may slightly increase 
accident rates, but that risk is likely outweighed by the value of a stable 
legal regime.284 Other times, tailoring a legal rule to new information is 
likely to generate significantly greater benefits. If information reveals 
that SEC regulation of derivatives markets is allowing high volatility due 
to uncertainty about the risk adhering to certain financial instruments, 
and that this dynamic could lead to another recession, adjustments of 
that regime will create important dividends. 
The costs of dynamism arise from two sources: the cost to 
government actors in developing and implementing law, and the costs 
to the regulated community of responding to law. Creating dynamic 
regulation is an inherently complex task that requires lawmakers to 
consider more than the immediate government action at hand. Putting 
in place mechanisms to address changing circumstances may require 
substantial investment at the front end as lawmakers design policy. 
Dynamic law may require more attention, involve more expertise, and 
take longer to develop. This burdens lawmakers and also delays 
regulatory intervention, as well as the social benefits that such 
intervention produces. This means the costs of developing dynamic law 
will virtually always exceed static law—however, the severity of that 
discrepancy may differ dramatically from context to context. Up-front 
costs also vary among varieties of dynamic law. Contingent regulation 
will often consume the most resources because it requires lawmakers to 
map foreseeable future circumstances and develop individual responses 
for each of the circumstances envisioned. Adaptive regulation and 
durational regulation do not require comprehensive prediction of future 
circumstances; rather, they require lawmakers to develop procedures 
and incentives to facilitate later reconsideration. As such, they will 
typically require fewer up-front resources than contingent regulation 
would, but greater up-front resources than static law. 
Dynamic law also imposes ongoing costs on government.285 These 
resources will be consumed by efforts to monitor the efficacy of the 
 
 284 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 285 By delayed costs, I mean costs that arise after the initial decision-making process. 
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initial legal rule. Modification under all three models of dynamic law 
will also consume resources. From this perspective, contingent 
regulation fairs better than adaptive regulation and durational 
regulation. Contingent regulation does not require government actors 
to develop new regulatory responses to emerging information. Rather, 
the legal regime itself has a blueprint identifying how legal rules will 
change. Nonetheless, contingent regulation requires government 
resources to formally trigger a contingency and notify regulated entities 
of new legal rules. Durational regulation and adaptive regulation will 
consume greater costs over time because they require lawmakers to 
reconsider the legal regime in light of new information. The process of 
reconsidering legal rules will also provide an opportunity for interested 
parties to engage in rent-seeking behavior to pursue modification of 
legal rules that are beneficial to them.286 
The ongoing costs of durational and adaptive regulation may be 
particularly high when these strategies are deployed by administrative 
agencies. NEPA and its state counterparts require analysis of foreseeable 
environmental consequences of agency decisions.287 Where agencies 
create internal mechanisms by which decisions will adjust, they must 
assess the consequences of each contingency incorporated into the legal 
framework alongside the consequences of the initial decision. Courts 
may also view adaptive regulation with skepticism, increasing the cost of 
that strategy.288 
Dynamic law, particularly adaptive and durational regulations, 
may also impose significant political costs. Virtually every modification 
of existing rules will result in a response from some political 
constituency. That response may constrain the willingness of 
government actors to engage in other sensitive decision-making 
processes, and it may result in a decision not to modify the legal rule 
 
 286 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 191, 196 (2012) (explaining the effects of using lobbying “to skew public policy in 
particular directions”). Congress’s inability to modify statutes, even when there is broad 
support for reform, exemplifies this pattern. The prospect of congressional action galvanizes 
interest groups to demand additional modifications in order to benefit their own interests. The 
Endangered Species Act may have benefitted from this phenomenon. During the 1990s, there 
was reasonably broad support for some modification of the Act to ameliorate some of its more 
economically costly effects. But Congress could not agree on a particular and limited set of 
adjustments, and as a result, the Act remained unchanged. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE 
MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 125–50 (2004). 
 287 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2015) (defining the word “effects” to include effects that 
are “reasonably foreseeable” for the purposes of NEPA); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064(d) 
(requiring consideration of “reasonably foreseeable indirect physical changes in the 
environment which may be caused by the project” under the California Environmental Quality 
Act). 
 288 See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 445. 
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despite new information justifying such modification. Revision of 
existing rules may also be perceived to shift blame. Where a legal rule is 
malfunctioning, current political leaders can lay responsibility at the feet 
of those leaders who developed the current rule. Once a revision is 
made, any further malfunction will be charged to current leadership. 
Dynamic law will also impose costs on regulated parties and other 
affected constituencies. For example, a change in the SEC rules 
governing the election of corporate boards may require companies 
subject to those rules to redesign their election procedures. A change in 
the emissions standards for nitrogen oxide may require companies to 
retrofit existing facilities or change production techniques. 
Uncertainty about legal rules may also chill investment. Where law 
is stable and certain, private parties can rely on it to order their affairs.289 
Dynamic law injects uncertainty into the legal environment, and may 
cause private parties to refrain from efficient investment, even if that 
investment would generate a social surplus. For example, an energy 
company may decide to forgo development of natural gas resources if 
mitigation measures designed to protect the greater sage grouse remain 
in flux and susceptible to significant change.290 This reluctance is likely 
to increase proportionally to the unpredictability of the legal regime. For 
that reason, contingent regulation may chill investment less than 
durational or adaptive regulation. Contingent regulation provides notice 
about future legal rules, and regulated parties may be able to quantify 
the costs of those future legal rules—and their probability of being 
triggered—and invest accordingly. Durational or adaptive regulation 
provide less notice of what future rules may be, thereby increasing the 
planning challenge for regulated parties. 
Finally, dynamic law will impose transitional costs. Even if the 
ongoing cost of complying with a legal rule may be the same as 
complying with a new rule, switching between the two may require 
regulated parties to retrain employees, reformulate production 
processes, or redesign products. Moreover, the individuals regulated by 
the new rule will incur cognitive costs as they reorient their behavior to 
conform to new requirements. 
B.     Varieties of Uncertainty 
The second variable lawmakers should consider is the type of 
uncertainty that they face. Too often, uncertainty is viewed as 
 
 289 See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text. 
 290 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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monolithic. A more nuanced conception of uncertainty reveals that the 
type of uncertainty involved in a decision has consequences for the 
optimal type of law.291 
Consider the stylized example of the highway department seeking 
to reduce accidents by modifying the speed limit. If the department has 
high confidence in the prediction that a fifty-five miles per hour speed 
limit will achieve the desired reduction in traffic accidents—in other 
words, uncertainty is low—static law may be the best approach, because 
the cost of promulgating static law is typically the lowest, and the 
benefits of dynamism would also be low. If, instead, the department has 
high confidence that adjusting the speed limit is the best approach to 
increasing safety—but does not know precisely what speed limit is 
necessary to achieve the desired reduction in accidents—it faces a 
circumstance where there is uncertainty, but that uncertainty is cabined 
to the degree of efficacy of the regulatory tool being deployed. Such 
circumstances favor contingent regulation. Finally, if the department 
has little confidence that adjusting the speed limit will improve safety, 
and is unsure what other steps it should consider, it faces general 
uncertainty about causation and the effectiveness of intervention. That 
situation favors either an adaptive or durational approach, enabling the 
department to consider other regulatory interventions such as enhanced 
enforcement or increased penalties as new information emerges. 
The inability to perfectly predict future conditions relevant to a 
lawmaking enterprise—as with the highway department considering a 
new speed limit—comes in at least three general varieties: risk, 
foreseeable uncertainty, and unforeseeable uncertainty. 
Risk involves circumstances where an identifiable set of future 
conditions is likely to occur and the likelihood of each condition can be 
ascertained.292 For example, when BLM establishes a buffer zone around 
sage grouse mating habitat, risk would be involved if BLM could 
determine that a half-mile buffer has a twenty-five percent chance of 
completely protecting that habitat, a fifty percent chance of slightly 
 
 291 This section discusses the degree of uncertainty that may exist. Varieties of uncertainty 
can be differentiated across other metrics too, although those metrics have less relevance to 
selecting a governance strategy. For example, some sources of uncertainty may be endogenous 
to a legal regime and other sources exogenous. In other words, sometimes information does not 
exist about the efficacy of a legal rule, or the harm caused by regulated activity, but uncertainty 
may also exist about the context of regulation that is not linked to the regulatory effort itself. 
For example, in regulating oil and gas development in order to protect the greater sage grouse, 
BLM may be uncertain about the extent to which climate change is harming the species. 
Climate change is not directly caused by development activities, nor is it sensitive to the 
portfolio of management decisions that BLM has at its disposal. It is, therefore, exogenous to 
the decision that is facing the agency, despite constituting an important factor for 
consideration. 
 292 See POSNER, supra note 69, at 290. 
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reducing the quality of the habitat, and a twenty-five percent chance of 
destroying the quality of the habitat. 
Uncertainty, and not risk, is involved if a reasonable estimate 
cannot be derived of both possible future circumstances and the 
likelihood that they will come to pass. Uncertainty itself can be further 
subdivided. Some uncertainty is foreseeable and other uncertainty is 
not. Donald Rumsfeld famously addressed this dimension of 
uncertainty when he distinguished between “known unknowns,” and 
“unknown unknowns.”293 Known unknowns are foreseeable. That is 
true even if no basis exists for estimating the likelihood that any one of a 
discrete set of identifiable future conditions will occur. 
Consider again BLM’s regulation of natural gas development and 
the effects of such development on greater sage grouse populations. 
Scientists may be able to foresee that development will affect the sage 
grouse, and based on observation or experimentation, identify possible 
aspects of development activities that cause harm. Sage grouse may 
abandon breeding habitat because humans visit nearby oil and gas 
infrastructure, because of the noise produced by such infrastructure, or 
because certain other species are attracted to such infrastructure. The 
magnitude of the effect of any of these vectors of disturbance or the 
sensitivity of that vector to intervention may be unknown, but a 
lawmaker would face foreseeable uncertainty in regulating, so long as 
these are the possible causes of greater sage grouse decline and 
mechanisms could be identified to address these causes, at least to some 
extent. If, however, oil and gas development affects the greater sage 
grouse through an entirely unrecognized pathway, it would constitute 
unforeseeable uncertainty. For example, natural gas development may 
actually affect sage grouse by increasing the frequency of wild fires, but 
no one recognized that issue at the time a management regime was 
created. Similarly, the emergence of a new technology that radically 
reduces the effect that drilling activities have on sage grouse may be 
unforeseeable.294 
The foreseeability of uncertainty may depend upon whether 
uncertainty pertains to chains of causation or the magnitude of effects. 
Understanding the relationship between the location of an oil and gas 
well and reproductive success of the sage grouse involves two inquiries: 
does proximity matter, and if so, how much does it matter. The first is a 
question about causal connection, the second a question about 
 
 293 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., DoD News Briefing—Secretary 
Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers (Feb. 12, 2002), http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/
Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636.  
 294 For a discussion of the incorporation of new technology into pollution control standards, 
see Blais & Wagner, supra note 174. 
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magnitude. Uncertainty about the magnitude of effects generally creates 
foreseeable uncertainty, whereas uncertainty about causation is more 
likely to create unforeseeable uncertainty.295 Contrast a situation where 
land managers understand too little about a natural system to identify 
likely causes of disturbance and one where land managers can identify 
five causes of disturbance but do not know the significance of any one 
cause. In the former circumstance, the managers face unforeseeable 
uncertainty; in the latter, they face foreseeable uncertainty. 
To the extent uncertainty is foreseeable—meaning that a potential 
range of future circumstances can be identified—lawmakers can identify 
substantive regulatory responses to address those possibilities. This will 
be particularly efficacious where regulatory responses are relatively 
simple. For example, where lawmakers are unsure about the future 
frequency of an activity subject to regulation, and therefore cannot 
identify the number of staff needed to effectively administer a program, 
a rule could be created that automatically increases staffing alongside an 
increasing prevalence of the activity.296 In other words, contingent 
regulation can effectively be deployed. On the other hand, if uncertainty 
is unforeseeable, lawmakers can only create mechanisms for modifying 
law as new information emerges. In other words, unforeseeable 
uncertainty requires either durational or adaptive regulation. 
C.     Lawmaker Resources 
The third variable affecting tool selection is the amount of 
resources available to a lawmaker. Lawmakers face dramatically 
different obligations and have dramatically different resources with 
which to carry out those obligations. Some lawmaking bodies have 
jurisdiction over only a few decisions; others must consider a whole host 
of competing priorities.297 The Federal Open Market Committee, for 
example, primarily wields but a single policy instrument: establishing 
target interest rates and authorizing the purchase and sale of securities 
to achieve those interest rates. 298  Legislative bodies of general 
jurisdiction, on the other hand, face innumerable demands on their 
attention.299 
 
 295 Uncertainty about the future prevalence of a regulated activity generally involves 
questions of magnitude, not of causation. See Wiseman, supra note 28, at 237–39 
 296 See id. at 247. 
 297 See, e.g., Pidot, Deconstructing Disaster, supra note 33, at 253–54. 
 298 See Mark F. Bernstein, Note, The Federal Open Market Committee and the Sharing of 
Governmental Power with Private Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV. 111, 112–15, 114 n.13 (1989). 
 299 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the 
Roots of the Takings “Muddle”, 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 839 (2006) (“[T]he police power [is] the 
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An assessment of the resources possessed by a lawmaker requires 
consideration of two measures. First, it must take into account the 
volume of issues requiring the lawmaker’s attention. Identifying the 
range of issues vying for position on an agenda will be defined, at least 
in part, by the scope of a lawmaker’s legal authority. Resource 
constraints inevitably require lawmakers to prioritize certain issues at 
the expense of others, and many will be entirely neglected.300 The more 
limited a lawmaker’s resources, the less desirable dynamic law is, 
particularly varieties that require substantial discretionary intervention 
by lawmakers, such as durational regulation. 
Second, an assessment of resources must take into account the 
variable capacities of lawmakers to make decisions. Some have the 
resources to make only a few decisions, while others can make a larger 
number. Governance capacity may turn on a number of factors, 
including the nature of the responsibilities of that body’s members, the 
degree of expertise the body possesses, and the complement of staff 
available to assist in formulation of policy. Contrast, for example, the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve with Wyoming’s legislature. 
The Board of Governors oversees a narrow, albeit extremely complex, 
set of issue—monetary policy and banking regulation—and it has only a 
handful of policy interventions at its disposal. 301  The Wyoming 
legislature potentially has before it the full panoply of issues arising 
under a state’s police power.302 The Board of Governors is made up of 
leaders in the financial field with a wealth of expertise.303 The legislature 
prides itself in being made up of every-day citizens, none of whom will 
have expertise in every issue.304 The Board of Governors has a staff of 
more than 2,650.305 Wyoming legislators lack even a single dedicated 
staff person, and the legislature as a whole is served by a small non-
 
states’ reserved power to regulate to protect the public health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare.”). 
 300 See Hirsch, supra note 76, at 1343–44. Conflicting demands on attention causes what is 
referred to as “task interference,” whereby the attention paid to any particular task is a function 
of the attention paid to other competing tasks. Id. at 1342–52. 
 301 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: 
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 4–6 (9th ed. 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_
complete.pdf. 
 302 See WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (“The legislative power shall be vested in a senate and house 
of representatives, which shall be designated ‘the legislature of the State of Wyoming.’”). 
 303 See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Janet Y. Yellen, http://
www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/yellen.htm (last updated Feb. 3, 2014). 
 304 See Citizen’s Guide to the Wyoming Legislature, WYO. ST. LEGIS., http://
legisweb.state.wy.us/leginfo/guide98.htm (last updated 2002) (“Wyoming remains one of the 
few states having a true part-time citizen legislature.”). 
 305 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. RESERVE, 100TH ANNUAL REPORT 
396 (2013). 
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partisan office with less than fifty full-time employees.306 The sixty 
members of the legislature serve only part time and the legislature itself 
convenes for an average of approximately one month a year.307 The 
members of the Board of Governors serve in their position full time.308 
Lawmakers, like individuals, also experience cognitive obstacles 
when facing numerous competing demands on their attention. 
Recognition of these obstacles flows from the concept of bounded 
rationality, which explains that the human brain has limited resources, 
and thus decision-making is naturally limited.309 Bounded rationality 
has spawned the entire literature of behavioral economics, and the 
insights from this field are important when considering governance in 
the face of uncertainty, because they underscore the restraints imposed 
by the lawmakers' limited attention. Making law requires time, mental 
energy, and attention; when this is in short supply, a legal regime 
requiring constant tending will fail. As Adam Hirsch has succinctly 
explained: “Governors are no less constrained in their mental resources 
than are the governed.”310 
The relative resource endowment of a lawmaker has significant 
implications for governance selection. The more well-endowed with 
resources the lawmaker, the more appropriate will be durational 
regulation, which allows for greater discretion on the part of lawmakers 
about if and when to revisit legal rules. Adaptive regulation, at least 
when well defined, creates a mechanism to automatically trigger 
reconsideration. Both strategies require a prolonged investment of 
resources by the lawmaker, but durational regulation will often require 
the greater investment. Therefore, where unforeseen uncertainty exists, 
a lawmaker with fewer resources would do well to rely on adaptive 
regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawmakers must develop legal regimes to address problems even 
when significant uncertainty exists about the nature of those problems 
 
 306 Legislative Service Office, WYO. ST. LEGIS., http://legisweb.state.wy.us/LSOWeb/
LegislativeServiceOffice.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2015). 
 307 Citizen’s Guide to the Wyoming Legislature, WYO. ST. LEGIS., http://legisweb.state.wy.us/
leginfo/guide98.htm#citizen (last updated 2002). 
 308 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2012); Who Are the Members of the Federal Reserve Board, and How Are 
They Selected?, FED. RES., http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12591.htm (last updated 
July 22, 2015). 
 309 See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS (1983); Hirsch, supra note 76, 
at 1331. 
 310 Hirsch, supra note 76, at 1333. 
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and the efficacy of legal responses. In doing so, lawmakers should be 
realistic about the legal, political, and informational obstacles they face, 
and design legal frameworks calibrated to effectively account for new 
information in practice, rather than just in theory. This Article has 
examined four types of mechanisms through which lawmakers can act. 
Each has advantages and each will be best suited to certain problems in 
particular contexts. 
The four strategies are separate and distinct, but in practice the 
boundaries separating one from another may blur. Sometimes a legal 
mechanism may plausibly be characterized as more than one type of 
regulation, and sometimes a legal regime will incorporate multiple 
mechanisms. Indeed, combining tools may often achieve the best 
outcome because most contexts involve multiple varieties of 
uncertainty. Moreover, static law may be coupled with dynamic law to 
obtain the benefits of each. For instance, a lawmaking body like 
Congress may enact a legal framework providing broad static goals that 
is separate and distinct from implementation of those goals, which may 
be carried out by a subsidiary government entity, like a federal agency, 
through dynamic law. 311  Aspects of the Endangered Species Act 
function in just this fashion. Section 7 entirely prohibits federal agencies 
from undertaking activities likely to jeopardize endangered species—a 
static legal rule.312 The Fish and Wildlife Service operationalizes that 
broad command and, in doing so, often relies on adaptive regulation.313 
At other times, a single lawmaker may deploy multiple legal tools 
to achieve a desired result. In BLM’s 2008 management plan for oil and 
gas development near Pinedale, Wyoming, the agency attempted to 
address potential impacts to the sage grouse by: (1) identifying specific 
triggering events to automatically cause identified management 
responses; (2) providing a means by which the agency could modify its 
mitigation plans as new information became available; and (3) 
establishing an annual meeting between BLM and regulated parties to 
discuss mitigation efforts. 314 In other words, the plan attempts to 
address the uncertainty attendant to developing oil and gas resources in 
sage grouse habitat through adaptive, durational, and contingent 
regulations. 
 
 311 Elements of the Clean Air Act provide a good example of this approach. As Ann Carlson 
has explained, the Clean Air Act has proven “surprisingly adaptable, durable and innovative” 
due, in part, to Congress’s use of broad statutory language to delegate authority to EPA. Ann 
Carlson, Lecture, An Ode to the Clean Air Act, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 119, 120 (2014). 
 312 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 7, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012)). 
 313 See Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen Canyon Dam: The Elevation of 
Social Engineering Over Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 896, 897 (2008). 
 314 See generally BLM 2008 SEIS APPENDIX, supra note 18, at 10-2 to -5. 
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This Article provides a theoretical and analytic framework to 
understand, assess, and choose among legal mechanisms that account 
for the uncertainty that confronts lawmakers. Each approach to 
governance has distinctive features, and distinguishing among them 
provides analytical clarity. Such clarity yields immediate practical 
benefits by enabling lawmakers to better structure governance. 
